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2Abstract
This study is about rigorously motivating dynamics of the European Union 
– its discursive capacity to effectuate change as a sui generis actor in foreign 
policy. It builds on the case study of the conflict between Russia and Georgia, 
involvement in which proved to be one of the most successful diplomatic 
endeavors of the EU. Whilst effectuating positive change towards more 
inclusiveness and certain predictability with Russia, the EU arguably opened 
the door for a new political dimension to the east of its borders. The analysis 
also looks broader on some new features of the EU foreign policy ‘actorness’
extracted from the empirical observations.
It aims to disentangle counterintuitive interrelationships in interaction of 
the two political logics applying discourse analysis. It concludes that together 
with possibilities the unique nature of the EU consisting of 27 soft 
rationalities of its member states will always have to account for some 
contextual challenges. However, it does not render the EU as an actor 
impossible; rather it formulates its unique integrative framework.
Key words: EU/Russia negotiations, EU foreign policy, actorness, discourses, 
impact 
Word count: 19643
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6Chapter I
Introduction and Study Overview
1.1. Introduction
This study is about a rigorously motivating capture of current European 
Union (EU) dynamics - the EU as a foreign policy actor studied on the 
example of negotiations with Russia over the conflict in Georgia.
The EU relationship to its near abroad has never seized to grasp attention in 
many ways. Just as it is a complicated web of analytically fascinating 
interdependencies, it is arguably the biggest practical challenge for the EU in 
terms of framing of its political influence in strategically important region for 
its future.
Brief recap of the European and the Russian media coverage on the EU-
Russia agreement for peace in Georgia demonstrated that the aspirations 
regarding the EU diplomatic role in this process ranged from deeply 
opportunistic to deeply antagonistic. Did the EU get it right? Did the EU do it 
right? Particular analysis departs from several empirical observations that 
despite the disagreements within the dynamics of negotiations, the talks with 
Russia proceeded and managed to generate certain impact. 
The claim about EU ineffectiveness to confront Russian expansionism is 
probably not quite accurate both on the accounts of complete EU 
ineffectiveness and of the Russian obstinacy to react to the EU plead.
At least, softer measures could not be related to inability to generate a 
framework for the EU interests – the EU delivered consistent messages and 
pursued with several concrete policies targeted at the establishment and 
maintenance of peace in Georgia. At most, these messages effectuated some 
change, although limited, in the Russian behavior. Thus, the discourse of the 
EU can be measured though the lenses of reserved rationality, which does not 
contradict transformative ontology of the EU system both for itself and for 
other actors. 
71.1.1. The conflict1
The memorable date of ‘08.08.08’ marked history as the Olympic opening 
in Beijing, and the outbreak war in Georgia - arguably one of the most 
uncivilized conflicts in modern history.
Close to midnight, Thursday, 7 August 2008. Georgia led by President 
Mikhail Saakashvili launched a surprise attack on Tskhinvali, the capital of 
the breakaway territory of South Ossetia (SO), Georgia’s conflict-zone of two-
decades, claiming to “restore constitutional order” (BBC 2008a, Lenta 
2008a). 
By Friday afternoon, the city of Tskhinvali is occupied by the Georgian 
forces reflected by the Russian and the Georgian peacekeepers mandated in 
SO. North Ossetia (NO) and Abkhazia send their reinforcement to Tskhinvali
continuously urging Russia to take part (Lenta 2008a), while the 
international community pleads to stop hostilities. Thousands of refugees 
flee from SO, hundreds die or wounded. By late afternoon Russia pours its 
“58th” army and air force, which demobilizes the Georgian army in SO and 
                                                          
1 The map adopted from www.stratfor.com, illustration of Kareli, Gori, Marneuli added by the author
8military bases in Vaziani, Kareli and Gori, including air force base in Marneuli 
(see map) by early evening (Lenta 2008a.b).
August 9. Georgia declares “a state of war”; Russia and the US clash 
severely over Georgia at the UN Council (BBC 2008a, Lenta 2008b). The EU
sends first delegation to the Georgian capital of Tbilisi attempting to stop fire, 
lead by the French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner accompanied by the 
Finnish Foreign Minister Alexander Stubb, also the president of the OSCE, 
who continue the talks in Moscow the next day expressing the need for “a 
new language and a new mode of co-operation” emphasizing the EU has no 
plans of “giving offence” (Telegraph 2008k). On August 10 Georgia begins 
ceasefire accusing Russia of invasion, yet operations on both sides continue 
providing increasingly controversial information; anger in Moscow escalates 
placing itself around the Georgian Black Sea coast (BBC 2008a). 
Meanwhile, in the framework of the EU Presidency, French President 
Nicolas Sarkozy supported by Mr. Kouchner calls Moscow and engages into 
negotiations (BBC 2008a). He elaborates an agreement for peace, and 
personally flies to Moscow on August 12 to sit at the table with the Russian 
President Dmitry Medvedev, hours after Medvedev announces the operation 
in Georgia can be complete (Medvedev 2008c).  This gives birth to the 
‘Sarkozy – Medvedev Agreement’ (also plan or deal) of 6 points, which will be 
brokered by the Presidency the same day between Moscow and Tbilisi 
securing the ceasefire. On August 13 the EU expresses “grave concern” and 
commitment to support the “lasting solution” in Georgia (Council 2008a.b). 
Yet, the Plan will have its ‘black holes’ formulating intensive negotiations 
between Moscow and the EU (Telegraph 2008i), and will be considered 
implemented only on October 8 2008 – 2 months after the outbreak of the 
war (Solana 2008l.m). The key events in the two discourses would be 
represented by the Extraordinary European Council on September 1 2008 in 
Brussels, and defining delegation to Moscow on September 8 2008
represented by Sarkozy and Kouchner with the European Commission 
President Jose Manuel Barroso and the EU High Representative for CFSP 
Javier Solana.  
91.2. Study Overview
This study is about the European Union and its discursive capacity as a 
supranational foreign policy actor. The aim is to analyze the impact of the EU 
on the Russian behavior as a result of negotiations around the conflict over 
the Georgian breakaway territories of South Ossetia and Abkhazia framed by 
the ‘Sarkozy - Medvedev Agreement’. 
The interest rests also in the broader context of the EU as a foreign policy 
actor. Specific case-study will be used to generate several hypotheses about 
the factors that may have influenced the negotiation process and that can be 
extended to the EU foreign policy ‘actorness’ in general, such as reserved 
rationality in the EU logic and the importance of personal representation.
The study maintains the following analytical framework: the EU is a 
supranational foreign policy actor that exists in a complex international 
environment. Whilst pursuing with its foreign policy its unique nature, that 
after all encapsulates 27 ‘normal’ states, challenges to overcome contextual 
pressures as well as historical bi-lateral ties of its members. Constructive 
capacity to change other actors’ behavior here finds its limits (at least before 
circumstances change), which could be understood as reserved constructivist 
change.
This does not mean that these challenges render the EU as a foreign policy 
actor impossible. Although opinions in process of the EU discourse formation 
can sometimes differ, the member-states instead of stumbling into the 
process chose to follow the logic of soft rationality – measured both in 
relation to each other and to the framework of the EU. The EU discourse 
evolves with every step; its successful ventures such as negotiations with 
Russia over Georgia may help understand the new dimensions to the EU as a 
foreign policy actor.
The Russian case is fresh and remarkable in various respects. First, Russia 
is not just a random actor. It entails the legacy of complicated socio-political 
interdependencies with the Union member-states. Moreover, it tends to view 
the EU in close relation to NATO – which can be interpreted as essentially 
skeptic. Finally, Russia is the main strategic EU partner in energy and trade, 
therefore the Union cannot be viewed as a power superior to Russia in that 
sense.  This context creates certain ‘quality check’ for the EU.
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1.2.1. Problem Formulation and Questions
As rightfully noticed by one political scientist, studying illusive and
complicated cooperation between the states would be undertaken by “no 
sensible person (…) on the grounds that its puzzles could readily be solved”
(Keohane 1984: 10).
This study does not claim to simplify this reality. Conversely, it treats the 
EU discourse as representative of one 
supranational actor – a complicated venture with various 
interdependencies, neither merely a number of bi-lateral relationships, nor a 
common political identity. This discourse encapsulates the interests of the EU 
members and changes behavior of other actors.
The analysis is concerned with 1) Specific context of the EU – Russia 
negotiation process, and 2) Broader context of the EU ‘actorness’. It combines 
constructivist observation of the impact of the EU negotiation process with 
the dynamics of its advance viewed through the prism of soft rationality 
extracted from the rational supranationalism theory.
The study will be guided by two questions, which are rather interrogative 
frameworks: 
I. What was the impact of the EU discourse on the Russian behavior? 
The aim here is in-depth assessment of the EU and the Russian discourses 
and their interaction. Firstly, the analysis observes two discourses in 
parallel comparing perceptions of the conflict. This is done with the 
purpose to highlight strategic contrast and correlation, which will help to 
elucidate the two narratives surrounding the conflict to subsequently test 
for change:  ‘Sharing Competencies in the Caucasus’ and ‘The New Security
Architecture?’.
Secondly, the impact of the EU discourse on the Russian behavior will be 
analyzed in interaction between the two discourses. Taking into account 
the specifics of the case, it is possible to observe discursive change both in 
relation to practical EU measures, and simultaneous penetration of its 
principles. Hence the second step is to assess the impact of the EU civil and 
diplomatic measures, finally, the impact around the narratives elaborated 
previously. 
This will be presented in the Chapter 3, which is the main empirical part of 
the study and will provide grounds for elaboration of subsequent 
hypotheses about the EU ‘actorness’.
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II. What new can the dynamics of the EU discourse tell us about the EU 
as a foreign policy actor?
The second interrogative framework seeks to explain the EU ‘actorness’ in 
a broader context. It will elaborate two working hypotheses: An actor with 
27 faces: Context and Reserved Rationality in the EU FP Discourse, 
discussing reserved rationality and contextual limitations present in the 
EU discourse during negotiations; and another characteristic recurrent in 
the EU appearance in Moscow – The importance of personality in EU FP.
This is the Chapter 4. It serves as the follow-up to the Chapter 3, thus is not 
equal in breadth but it serves the crucial purpose of taking the analysis 
further.
Box 1: Problem Formulation
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1.2.2. Approach
Analyzing a process which is essentially history in the making is not an 
easy task; therefore, it has its limitations. It will not seek to understand the 
past of the conflict: the relationship between Russia and Georgia, and Georgia 
and South Ossetia and Abkhazia is easily a scientific publication, just as is the 
analysis of the EU presence in the Caucasus over time.
Instead it will focus empirically on the factor of primary importance when 
analyzing the effect of negotiations - the fact of agreement (e.g. 
Hopmann1996). In the EU-Russian negotiations the outcome is the ‘Sarkozy -
Medvedev Agreement’ with two relevant events: the fact of ceasefire and the 
rest of the criteria targeted at longer term security set out by the Agreement. 
Hence it concerns the change in the Russian discourse allowing immediate 
implementation of measures and creating a background for the diplomatic 
presence of the EU. The study is concerned with the discourses surrounding 
this period stretched from August 8 2008 through October 21 2008. 
The approach is to isolate various factors in the negotiation process to 
show that “they have implications for behavior that are often surprising and 
counterintuitive” (Elster 1989: 9-10). Discourse analysis will first outline 
parallel perceptions on the conflict, and then focus on the dynamics between 
the two: through application of the EU measures and around two elaborated 
narratives: ‘Sharing Competencies in the Caucasus’ and ‘The New Security
Architecture?’. Empirical categories would help to generate two broader 
hypotheses about the EU as a foreign policy actor: An actor with 27 faces: 
Context and Reserved Rationality in the EU FP Discourse, and The importance 
of personality in EU FP. Thus the EU is the analytical centre and Russia is the 
periphery.
Alternatively, the approach could be to study existing conceptions about 
the EU foreign policy, and then analyze how they reflect in the EU effect on 
Russia. However, the case of the Georgian conflict is interesting in its 
complexity and potential counterintuitive outcomes.
The study strongly advocates treating the two frameworks together precisely 
because the case is considered a success in the EU foreign policy. Thus, 
minding the evolving nature of the EU, it may shed some light on its broader 
‘actorness’.
Theoretically and methodologically, entire analysis adopts the
constructivist logic combined with rational supranationalism - emphasizing 
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the ‘soft’ rationalist (as opposed to fixed preferences of the member-states) 
reservations in the discourse formation. Thus the discourse is not only an 
illustration of interaction but also a series of steps pursued by the both sides. 
1.2.3. Purpose and Contribution
The goal of the study is to create in-depth understanding of the EU 
negotiation process with Russia with the change it was able to effectuate, and 
to generate broader hypotheses about the EU ‘actorness’. 
Firstly, the study contributes to the theoretical debate maintaining that 
national presence in EU discourse is not necessarily in denial of 
transformative effects of the EU as an actor in foreign policy, both for other 
actors and the EU itself. Herein, the study introduces the mixture of 
constructivism and rational supranationalism.  
Secondly, the study contributes with an empirical standpoint to the debate 
about the civil and normative power of the EU as a foreign policy actor which 
subsequently may concentrate on the EU diplomatic power as a distinct 
capacity.
Finally, expressing both academic and personal commitment, the study 
approaches the EU/Russia relationship as a positive step forward to creating 
equally beneficial political understanding between the two significant actors. 
Being able to exploit the ability to assess first-hand the discourse on the 
Russian side, the author hopes to bring the original perspective on the 
Russian behavior, too.
1.2.4. Structure of the Presentation
This presentation is divided into five chapters. This chapter introduced the 
case and outlined the research. Chapter II will create the context for the case 
through conceptual overview and theory, concluding with the method. 
Chapter 3 will concentrate on the empirical analysis aiming to answer 
question I of the study. Finally chapter IV will extend the analysis to the 
broader context and elaborate on two hypotheses aiming to answer question 
II. The conclusions will be presented in Chapter V. 
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Chapter II 
Concepts, Theory and Method
2.1. The EU as a Foreign Policy Actor
Firstly, it is important to establish the context of the study for the EU FP as 
a sui generis phenomenon. 
Albeit approached empirically from different angles, complexity of the EU 
FP does not allow to land easily neither within conventional IR theories, nor 
within the theories of European integration (Diez and Whitman 2000, 
Rummel 1994). The nature of the European foreign policy can bare
essentially different ontological and epistemological considerations; even for 
the European Community it is troublesome – “too unique” and “not as 
unique” (Ohrgaard 2004: 26-27).  
2.1.1. The EU Foreign Policy (EU FP) ‘Actorness’
How to relate an inherently state concept to the EU, and what is the EU FP 
‘actorness’?
Roughly, there are three approaches to the EU FP. It can be discussed as 
the EC external economic relations, or Pillar I, including international trade 
and aid etc. (M. Smith 1998, Dent 1997). It can be approached as Pillar II 
issues – CFSP and CSDP – focusing on specific institutional practices, for 
example, in conflict management (Jørgensen 1997, K. Smith 2003). 
Institutionally the CFSP is represented by the acting Presidency of the 
Council; the Commissioner for external affairs and the High Representative
for the CFSP also act on behalf of the Union (Elgström, Strömvik in Elgstom, 
Jönsson eds. 2005).
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Finally, the EU FP represents the foreign policies of the member states, 
which includes concern with earlier framework of EPC and the role of the 
member states in its subsequent developments (Manners and Whitman 2000, 
Strömvik 2005).
The scope of this study is conflict-specific, therefore empirically it targets
discursive practices emerged from the Pillar II. Yet, analytically these 
practices should not be limited by dismissing influences of other priorities 
derived from the Pillar I and the role of the member states. Thus, the study 
assumes that the EU FP is a series of action towards the third party derived 
from complex framework of the EU multilateral governance. 
On this basis the EU ‘actorness’ should be conceived of as having a capacity 
to contribute and overlap with autonomy (Bretherton Vogler 2006) behaving 
“actively and deliberately in relation to other actors in the international 
system” (Sjöstedt cited in Bretherton, Vogler 2006: 17). Serving the purpose 
of the study, the EU ‘actorness’ does not relate to the IR definition of 
international organization (Rosenau 1990), neither to performance of one of 
the EU institutions separately (e.g. Commission discussed by Hocking, Smith 
1990), but to the overall impact of the EU. Its actions, or discursive practice, 
have impact with both intended and unintended consequences (Bretherton, 
Vogler 2006: 22). 
2.1.2. The EU FP ‘Soft Powers’
An as actor the EU developed some sort of supranational power, which 
received many labels: soft, civil, diplomatic, normative, ideational, and even
militaristic. This indicates one thing – the EU FP power is very hard to define.
2.1.2.1. The Concept of Power
During the last few decades there has been a considerable shift in 
understanding of power - from traditional coercion to liberalist collective 
self-defense against aggression (Hoffmann 1998: 80). The evolution of 
strictly ‘unethical’ realist theory led to post-neorealist reshuffling of values as
weak variables in state behavior (Waltz 1996, Jørgensen in Lucarelli,
Manners 2006: 51-2), while the outcomes of military power strategies were
increasingly challenged as “meaningless in a zero-sum context” (Schelling 
1984: 269). The neoliberal perspective in its turn discovered complex 
interrelationships between institutions and state actions and multifaceted 
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nature of power in IR as possible with or without reference to “common 
purposes (…) or a shared belief in a set of values” (Keohane 1989: 159). 
Nye introduced the concept of soft power ‘empowering’ it with intangible 
resources such as institutions, ideology or culture (1990) basically moving 
from ‘thick’ to ‘thin’ power. However, his confusion between power resources 
and scope upset several researchers (Karlsnaes, Risse, Simmons eds. 2002: 
186).
Later Nye and Keohane explained power in condition of globalism and 
“issues connecting societies” substituting military with economic, 
environmental and socio-cultural explaining the discourse as not uniform but 
varying by region, locality, and issue area (2000). Yet to understand the 
impact of its power there is a need for somewhat more supranational, or 
particular, EU approach. 
2.1.2.2. Civilian and Normative Power: A long journey
Already in the 60s Carr suggested three elements to the EC power: 
economic, military and power over opinion (1962: 108). Later, however, the 
military dimension mutated into diplomacy and the use of legally-binding 
supranational institutions to solve collective problems which defined the 
essence of the EC civilian power (Twitchett 1976, Maull 1990). Duchêne also 
tried to capture the transformation of military into collective civilian ends 
and means extending it to the sense of equality, justice and tolerance (1972: 
20).  He described the EC as an idée force capable to extent the ideas of 
Europe to widely differing political settings (1973: 7). 
Galtung adopted more structural approach to ideological power
emphasizing the EC strength on the sources of power, such as resource and 
structural (1973). Latter, Bull brought back the criticism of the EC as 
ineffective civilian power lacking military self-sufficiency (1982). 
Later studies criticized the EU civilian approach to exercise of military 
power particularly with the development of CSDP in the Pillar II (Whitman 
1998), which was extended to the question of whether the Union could lose 
its civilian status (K. Smith 2000). Zielonka argued that the EU strategic 
choices could acquire distinct profile precisely via military means (1998). 
Although discussed acutely, it is impossible to sustain grounded empirical 
observation of the ‘military power Europe’ in particular study, neither 
normative justification for its use (Diez, Manners in Berenskoetter, Williams 
eds.: 2007: 178).  However, this is not to dismiss in further studies.
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Another deviation of the civil power is pioneered by Manners. He avoided
the civil/military dichotomy by diving into the normative power Europe with 
five core values embedded in the Treaties: democracy, peace, liberty, the rule 
of law, and respect for human rights (2002).  He shifted the attention towards 
the long-term processes: the EU could define (reframe) the ‘normal’ in 
international politics (2002: 236). So far, it managed to demonstrate moral 
superiority, for instance, over the US in execution (Bretherton, Vogler 2006: 
43).
Being just a part of the complicated whole the normative power may have 
a bearing to the study of the EU discourse. If the EU is to change the Russian 
behavior it would automatically introduce some of its principles; and at least 
will have to distance itself from the US. 
On the ideational level the EU has another important feature – it is 
constructive for itself, thus evolving overtime identifying own ‘actorness’. 
Either by “purposefully constructing” (Webber et. al. 2004: 23) own identity 
or involved in irreversible spill-over the EU discourse overtime tends to 
define its characteristics.
2.1.2.3. Measures and Principles
Thus, the EU discourse must also include some dichotomy between 
measures and principles that will constitute one whole of its impact. The 
CFSP rhetoric, from which the analysis derives, is a highly ‘principled’ 
venture bringing a whole battery of overarching values that may read as
“human rights, the rule of law, international law and effective 
multilateralism” (Solana, Council 2009).
The European Security Strategy reads (Council 2003 in Lucarelli, Manners
eds. 2006: 3): 
Europe should be ready to share in the responsibility for global security and in 
building a better world(…)Spreading good governance, supporting social and 
political reform, dealing with corruption and abuse of power, establishing the rule of 
law and protecting human rights are the best means of strengthening the 
international order.
The EU principles penetrate the EU measures, for instance2: 
 conflict prevention: preventing violence through co-operation, external 
assistance, trade policy instruments, humanitarian aid, social and 
environmental policies, diplomatic instruments and political dialogue etc.
                                                          
2 European Commission, External Relations, http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/cfsp/cpcm/index.htm
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 civilian crisis management as the core of strengthening the CSDP through 
‘police, strengthening of the rule of law, strengthening civilian 
administration and civil protection’
In the EU rhetoric the EU FP is a symbol of political ‘goodness’. In 
exercising its power the EU also manifests ‘peaceful’ measures. The EU FP 
does, indeed, have a substantial uniqueness: its development did not evolve 
against the framework of war, like say, NATO or UN (Strömvik 2005), but of 
sustaining peace (K. Smith 2003). The question arises, however, how did 
common sense become the EU values?
For failing to explain exactly this, other actors may relate the EU principles 
to its approach. That represents a more complex picture - it changes with the 
EU FP objectives. For instance, in environmental policy the EU is an advocate 
of human rights, whereas in trade it uses a more coercive top-down approach 
(chapters 3,4 in Bretherton, Vogler 2006). 
In areas of conflict management the EU FP principles are contested 
(Nikolaidis, Howse 2002) and the policies tend to float from case to case 
(chapter 7 in K. Smith 2003). Inclusive identity of the EU suffers in FP since 
the EU often contrasts itself to the “significant other” (A. Smith 1992: 95), as 
in the case of EU-Russia relations. 
2.1.3. The EU FP and Russia
Having said that it is useful to note what characterizes particularly the 
EU/Russia FP relationship, which started with the ‘Strategic Partnership’ 
agreement in 1999. Very generally, it is an unclear strategic vision of the
‘spaces’ added in 2003 of freedom security and justice, external security, 
research and education (Barysch in Johnson, Robinson 2005: 26-30). 
Whilst sustaining economic, trade and energy dialogue Russia and the EU 
share the feeling of instability, distrust, even fear on the EU side, firstly, of 
Russia being an unstable partner, secondly, of disintegrative effect via close 
Russian ties with some bigger members for the EU itself (ibid.: 31). It results 
in securitization of various FP issues such as visa regime (Prozorov 2006). 
Nevertheless, Russia and the EU share much in common, especially 
regarding post - 9/11 challenges to global security coincident with advent of 
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Putin’s administration (Averre in Johnson, Robinson 2005: 75-6)  signifying 
the uplifting of the Russian state. 
Just as the EU needs Russia, Russia needs the EU not least for its regional 
initiatives. Medvedev noted already in 2000 that the EU is the “only 
institution” with structural capability “to deal with regionalization of Russia” 
(Medvedev quoted in Klitsounova in Johnson, Robinson 2005: 49). 
Yet, Russia seems to remain the EU’s “close outsider” (Aalto 2006). 
Discursive capacities are limited for the reason some call “incompatibility”
(Kratochvil 2008). The values that shape the EU-Russia relations such as the 
rule of law, democracy and human rights do not seem to settle into a common 
ideational framework (Panebianko in Lucarelli, Manners 2006). 
If, in this case, the EU should have an impact, there must be a renewed 
diplomatic approach that should include both measures and principles into 
one carefully designed framework considering the environment of the 
negotiations.
Albeit the empirics would serve the better purpose of measuring the 
degree and the nature of impact, the study needs a broader view on how the 
impact should be possible, and how it could be defined in relation to the EU 
members and supranational FP practice in process of its diplomatic discourse 
formation.  
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2.2. Theory 
2.2.1. Constructivism
The analysis targets in-depth exploration of the discursive construction of 
influence of the EU on the Russian behavior under the limitations of 
contextual political reality. It seeks to view the EU as driven by a complex 
variety of factors in contrast to traditional approaches to foreign policy. The 
inquiry on how the EU can penetrate another sphere of influence creates the 
first theoretical framework. 
Constructivism has the merit of pointing to the essential: any process 
obtains a different intellectual straightjacket for different observers and 
participants, influencing their interpretation and their actions. 
It builds on the episteme of hermeneutic interpretation and views all 
aspects of reality as contextualized. Ontologically the world is anti-
foundationalist but dependent on interpretation of knowledge relative to 
mutually constitutive interaction between an ‘agency’ (ex. an individual, a 
state) and a ‘structure’ (Adler 2002: 95, Marsh, Stoker eds. 2002: 26, Wendt, 
1999, Wight 2007). Latter relates to the products of social interaction that 
constructs norms, which in their turn construct interests that finally, provide 
meaning to material conditions (Wendt, 1999: 139). Hence, the agents can 
either maintain or constrain structures, at the same time their behavior is a 
direct reflection of those structures.
Constructivism leads to inevitable importance of language and discourse 
(Habermas 1996). Discourse shares concerns about various tangible and 
intangible patterns behind the social artifacts. Postmodernists, for example, 
use the discourse to understand the EU as a site of power relations, where 
knowledge and power meet and construct perceptions of the EU building on 
methods such as ‘genealogy’, ‘governmentality’, and ‘deconstruction’ 
developed by Foucault, Derrida and Nietzsche (Manners 2006: 84-85).
Discourse analysis is also a method, which comes in various forms seeking 
to understand the social practice, power structures, political realities 
(Fairclough 1995, Gomm 2004, Philips, Hardy 2002). It can ideally be used in 
constructivist research, as chosen in this study, and will be elaborated upon 
more specifically in the methodology section.  
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2.2.1.1. Constructivism and Power
This study is concerned primarily with the relationship between the 
states, thus the dimension of power-politics. One weakness constructivism 
possesses in this respect is the diffuse relationship to power (Kauppi 2005: 
22). 
One reflection of this void can be found in the postmodern critical 
approach.  Bourdieu, for instance, related the “social struggles” not only to 
cultural practices but directly to structural power relations causing novel 
forms of domination (Bourdieu 2001: 20). In support of that thinking, other 
theorist argued that in order to understand various effects of the European 
integration on politics one should mind the weaknesses of ideational notion 
of culture (Kauppi 2005: 22). Thus, the critical version sustains that the 
actions constitute indispensible notion of power in addition to cultural values 
and interests derived from shared competences at the European level.
2.2.1.2. Constructivism as an active theory
It can be assumed that constructivism becomes an active theory wherever 
and whenever a process of socialization takes place. In case of particular 
study this process is followed through the Russian and the EU discourses 
around the conflict in Georgia. 
Constructivists outlined a number of conditions under which the process 
of learning should be considered effective, such as situations of high 
uncertainly, situations affecting legitimate norms and rules, equal 
deliberative environments (Checkel 2001, Johnston 2001). Even if the two 
first situations can be interpreted as the driving factors behind the EU 
involvement in the negotiations process with Russia, the latter fails to explain 
the environment of a complex political reality. 
2.2.1.3. Rationality in constructive discourse
Communication is unequal and distorted already on the level of internal 
social interaction (e.g. ‘communicative action’ by Habermas 1996). On the 
level of political discourses it is affected by a myriad of internal and external 
constraints (ibid.). Majority of them derive from the behaviour of actors that 
corresponds at least marginally to their strategic interests and path-
dependent established relationships. The EU member-states do not exist in a 
vacuum. They are the states with established long-term economic and foreign 
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relationships not only with their co-members, but also with the non-EU states 
- for instance, France and Germany through energy trade with Russia - which 
formulates the ‘environment’ of the study. 
To explain such environment it is important to mind that the EU discourse 
is an outcome of complex process of interaction between the member-states’ 
rationalities, as opposed to idealist constructivist ontology of normatively 
appropriate behaviour (March and Olsen 1998: 951). Thus, predominant 
strategic interests of the member states would most likely exhibit themselves 
in the EU discourse. However, they are neither fixed, nor manifest in the form 
of ultimatum in the EU institutions –they are ‘soft’ or reserved rationalities 
(see Textbox 1).
In this sense, the EU discourse cannot be simplified to Moravcsik’s
rationally-calculated expected outcomes. Instead, it finds itself within 
socialization of the European values and soft rationalist calculus – a 
combination of constructivism and rational supranationalism – an approach
that goes deeper into constraining factors of soft rationality, but also self-
reinforcing effect of the EU supranational practices, as will be explained 
further.
2.2.1.4. The framework so far 
Constructivism sustains the explanation of impact of the EU discourse on 
the Russian discourse as: 1) changing the Russian behavior and perceptions 
based on its ‘principled’ FP agenda 2) evolving thus constructive for the EU 
‘actorness’.
Constructivism does not explain constraints and characteristics of the 
complexity of unequal political environment in which interaction takes place, 
and the fact that the foreign policy negotiation process continues even 
though the interests of some EU states within one discourse may be 
jeopardized. 
As the purpose of this study endorses a deeper analysis of the EU foreign 
policy ‘actorness’ and seeks to understand also the constraining context of 
the EU discourse, constructive take on discourse analysis will be dissolute 
with presence of soft rationalism in the member-states’ logic derived from 
their relations with Russia.
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2.2.2. Rational Supranationalism (RS)
Supranationalism is specifically elaborated for the EU seeking to explain 
self-reinforcing nature of the EU integration and socialization processes 
(Schimmelfening, Rittberger in Richardson 2006: 84-86). It treats the EU as a 
sui generis actor. It shares the transformative nature of political reality and 
norms with constructivism. This is the major frontline where the two 
theories correlate. 
2.2.2.1. Rationality in Supranationalist discourse
The self-reinforcement in the EU does not 
only derive from sociological value-exchange. 
Specifically rational supranationalism, as the 
name suggests, shares rationalist assumptions 
about the nature of institutions with 
intergovernmentalism. It treats the mechanisms 
behind integration as path-dependent striving 
to maximize collective utility, which makes 
them both enabling and constraining for the 
member-states (Schimmelfening, Rittberger in 
Richardson 2006: 84-86). It takes recourse to 
the logic of historical institutionalism 
emphasizing that not all consequences of 
political interaction are predictable but face the 
irreversible “unintended consequences” 
(Pierson in Schimmelfening, Rittberger in 
Richardson 2006, Scharpf 1998). 
Values and preferences can be generated 
both exogenously and endogenously – in the 
member states and though socialization on the 
level of the EU institutions. Institutional 
practices help the member states to discover 
and upgrade their common interests (Haas
1961). Involving in this process the members 
states are not always aware of long-term 
outcomes. 
Textbox 1
Soft, or reserved
rationality in this essay 
may be used 
interchangeably. It 
indicates that rationality 
of the EU member states 
is not fixed and thus 
cannot be explained by 
purely individualistic 
interests. It is related to 
exogenous factors the EU 
states are in principle 
unable to change or 
ignore, such as their 
bilateral relationships 
with the third parties. The 
EU framework, however, 
unites the states to 
measure individual 
rationality against the 
rationalities of the co-
members; therefore, the 
member states are ready 
to make sacrifices if the 
stake of another member-
state is higher, even if 
they will not gain any real 
long term profit.
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2.2.3. The Framework for the EU FP
Rational supranationalism is essentially integrationist. However, it 
supports that the EU states are, above all – the ‘normal’ states. The EU policy 
is the convergence of their contextual interests emerged through self-
reinforcing spill-over processes. Therefore, it does not contradict the logic of 
constructive change – the ground philosophy of the study; yet does not 
explain how the EU as a sui generis actor can have an impact on other actors 
without constructivism. 
Yet, RS is more accurate in understanding, firstly, the existence and 
limitations of exogenous factors in complicated political environment 
shaping the foreign policy negotiations process – contextual nature of the EU 
FP discourse, and the fact that cooperation, or negotiation process, continues 
even though the interests of some member states may periodically be favored 
– soft rationality (see textbox 1). 
Secondly, it takes for granted that existence of certain constraints will 
always be present, which does not render further cooperation impossible, 
but helps to explain the nature of the EU foreign policy ‘actorness’ in a 
broader context. 
It adds to the existing framework the following - the EU discourse is: 
1) changing the Russian behavior and perceptions based on its 
‘principled’ agenda, although its outcome will depend on contextual 
limitations of complex political reality and path-dependent bi-lateral 
relations of its member states. However, even if the balance of interest is 
not perfect, cooperation continues because the members chose to 
measure their rationalities against the framework of the other 
members, and the EU (see box 1).  
2) evolving thus constructive for the EU ‘actorness’.
Together this framework may be viewed through the logic of reserved 
constructivism, which means that the EU ‘soft’ power is able and/or willing to 
change behavior of other actors to the extent limited by its measured 
multilevel reserved rationality. 
This will be used as a working ‘ideology’ for both interrogative 
frameworks of the study.
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2.3. Method
The method chosen for the study of the EU impact on the Russian behavior 
is discourse analysis, which builds on constructivism and corresponds to the 
theoretical choices - bridging constructivism with unequal political reality of 
rational supranationalism - to assess complex variables surrounding the 
negotiation process between the EU and Russia.
2.3.1. Discourse Analysis
When I use a word…it means just what I choose it to mean – neither more 
nor less. The question is, said Alice, whether you can make words mean so 
many different things. The question is, Humpty-Dumpty responded, which is 
to be master, that’s all
‘Humpty-Dumpty’ by Lewis Carroll, 1960
The master of nonsense-verse Lewis Carroll pointed to the essential: 
reality is a product of wide variety of social arrangements and practices 
(Potter 1996: 12), where the truth is only a subjective image. This is also the 
basis of discourse analysis, which seeks for narratives beyond physically 
present manifestations.
Discourse analysis is both a method and a theory that essentially states 
that discourse matters - it has an ability to produce reality and define actions 
(Philips, Hardy 2002, Fairclough 1995). Specifically, discourse analysis seeks 
to examine certain discourses to understand and explain what they reveal 
about socially constructed reality and power relations in general.
As a technique, it supports the analysis of transformative nature of the EU 
discourse. Actors can change reality. On a deeper level, it chases the nature, 
or the circumstances, of this impact, allowing to generate assumptions about 
wider context affecting the EU ‘actorness’ in foreign policy. How the actors 
can change reality. Thus it is ideally fit for the two interrogative frameworks 
of particular research.
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2.3.1.1. The definition of Discourse
As one scholar put it, the term ‘discourse’ is almost meaningless until the 
analyst fills it up with own meaning (Gomm 2004: 246). In essence, 
‘discourse’ may be understood in different ways. Most commonly, discourse 
is the way in which the world is interpreted (thus created) by individuals, the 
patchy manifestations of which can be found in the social artifacts, or texts 
(Gomm 2004: 246). More descriptively, discourse may be presented as the 
words themselves and entangled in the ways the words are being arranged. 
In addition, the ‘discourse’ is the ‘context’. It could be understood as existing 
independently of the social artifacts, with texts being reflections of broader 
ways of thinking (Gomm 2004, Philips, Hardy 2002: 3-4). 
Particular study would treat the discourse as related to the actors - the EU 
and Russia - as producers of the discourse, as the logic suggests. As soon as it 
is produced, discourse involves into the process of interaction and has a 
capacity to change and affect other actors. 
However, in particular case it is both inscribed in the texts and in the 
series of actions surrounding the conflict, which allows to unite the EU 
measures and principles in one discourse. Simultaneously, it is inevitably 
related to the context in which it is formulated, and reflects the capacities of 
the producer to construct reality, or exercise influence, in a broader sense 
(see textbox 2).  
2.3.1.2. Adoption of Discourse Analysis as a Method
This study is concerned with the effect of the EU discourse on the Russian 
behavior assessed though interaction between the two, and the implications 
for broader understanding of the EU ‘actorness’.
Thus it adopts the assumption that discourse analysis is able to assess 
different interrelationships of actors derived from the texts (Faiclough 1995).
It treats the EU FP according to a two-dimensional guideline: though the 
social artefact itself it produces – or the text, and the discursive practice or 
other discourses that the text builds upon (Fairclough, 1995: 56-57, Philips, 
Hardy, 2002: 85-87, Marsh and Stoker 2002). This framework includes also a 
series of action, or measures, implemented via discourse.
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Discursive practices are constraints formulated in process of the EU 
discourse formation. It is important that 
discursive practices are not directly 
representative of separately existing 
discourses surrounding the EU discourse
(Philips, Hardy, 2002: 3-4, Fairclough 1995) 
but appearing in process of the EU discourse 
formation – thus, in process of production of 
the chosen texts. It will help to highlight
contextual factors in the EU discourse, and to 
hypothesize further about the EU ‘actorness’ 
in a broader context (see textbox 2).
It may be argued that the social practice 
should be accessed separately from the text 
because it is the indicator of how the actors 
make use of various social practices, 
suggesting they may be different from the 
variables present in the text itself (Philips, 
Hardy 2002: 85-87). In this study, the 
emphasis is on the official discourse as a 
whole, therefore it is not necessary to 
deconstruct what the French government had 
to say at home and how the French President used it at the EU level, for 
instance (Philips and Hardy 2002: 85-87). Instead, it is assumed that 
priorities were formulated at the EU level.
The discourse will follow the dynamics of the negotiation process, thus 
major analytical emphasis would be on the interaction between the EU and 
Russia – e.g. how the Russian discourse changed in accordance with the EU 
measures or rhetoric. However, in order to outline the context, and find 
subsequent categories to test for change, the analysis (in Chapter 3) will start 
with parallel assessment of the EU and the Russian perceptions of the 
conflict. 
Such categories in this study are called ‘narratives’ (Fairclough 1995), or 
the stories that the two sides told about the conflict. The points of 
coincidence and contrast will indicate their strategic spheres of interests and 
major points of disagreement. Subsequently it should be possible to observe 
the change in the Russian ‘plot’.
Textbox 2
Discourse is directly 
related to the actors’ 
negotiation process. It 
will be represented by the 
official texts, which will 
encapsulate also the 
discursive practices and 
the social practice. It is 
maintained that specific 
nature of official 
empirical material allows 
for this merger. 
Discursive practice 
would be represented 
specifically by the 
inconsistencies in process
of the EU discourse 
formation.
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2.3.2. The Logic
Overall approach to the study is qualitative and inductive, which in 
contrast to traditional deductive methods, benefits from an open non-linear 
way of analysis highlighting new elements and relations of casualties (Babbie 
et al. 2007: 13; Flick 2006: 98-102). 
Hence, the analysis relies heavily on the data from which hypotheses are 
derived during the research (Flick 2006). Essentially it seeks for probabilistic 
arguments to explain the data with the help of theoretical observations 
(Babbie et al., 2007). It does not seek to provide a definite answer but to 
presume about possible explanations based on the available material, thus 
does not strive for generalization but for elaboration of working hypotheses.
In contrast, quantitative methods are generally characterized with more 
credibility, preciseness and validity (Babbie et al., 2007), thus empirical 
generalization on the base of numerical evidence (Gomm et. al. 2000: 4).
Qualitative understanding on the other hand is concentrated on forces
driving individual actions, and explains causal links in real-life interventions 
too complex for survey (Yin 2003). Quantitatively, the prospective 
conclusions of this study may be tested in the long term by, say, examining 
the breadth of similar changes the EU discourse effectuates under similar 
circumstances.  
2.3.3. The Case Study 
This thesis concentrates on the case study of the Russian-Georgian 
conflict. On its basis, it seeks to understand and assess the dynamics between 
the EU and the Russian discourses. It inquires what these dynamics have to 
provide for the effect of the EU discourse on the Russian behavior, as well as 
for the broader EU foreign policy ‘actorness’. Hence, it includes two contexts: 
the narrow context around the conflict and the broader context of the EU 
‘actorness’. The former is presumed as capable to explain specific factors, 
such as discursive limitations or possibilities that may be extended to the 
latter. 
Case studies are considered to be a “full and thorough knowledge of the 
particular” (Stake 2000: 22, 24). Although this is a single case study, it is 
approached through comparison of the two discourses surrounding the same 
conflict and should help detect causalities that could not be detected 
otherwise (Gomm et al. 2000: 6) increasing the quality of the analysis.
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By nature, the study includes not generalization but elaboration of 
hypotheses with the help of empirical and theoretical observations in the 
unique case in the EU foreign policy that can have something to offer for the 
EU foreign policy ‘actorness’. 
2.3.3.1. Empirical Data
Discourse analysis builds heavily on the data. This thesis has the sufficient 
amount of balanced data for the analysis with conservative framework of the 
official discourse of Russia and the EU around the conflict in Georgia. It builds 
on the material carefully collected and categorized chronologically from the 
EU and the Russian official databases.  These sources are considered as 
credible, they also define the temporal framework for the analysis: August 8 
2008 – October 21 2008. 
To be able to extract discursive practices (see textbox 2) in process of the 
EU discourse formation it was necessary to support the official EU discourse 
with secondary material. A number of articles were selected to broaden the 
picture of the official documents following the logic of strategic, or 
“purposeful”, sampling (Berg 1989: 110) - particular sources for particular 
purpose with account for trustworthiness of the data. Whilst it was not 
possible to encompass all relevant data, available material was selected to 
complement this as best as possible. Same was decided for the Russian 
sample to balance the outcomes.
The abovementioned techniques have been chosen to assist one another 
as triangulation of one qualitative method (Flick 2006), improving the quality 
of the results and providing with more interesting and complex data.
a). The EU discourse (Annex 1)
The official WebPages of the European Commission, the Council of the 
European Union, and the European Parliament were searched for all official 
documents concerning negotiations with Russia over the Georgian conflict,
which left the author with the amount of 16 official documents represented 
as official addresses, press releases and interviews (a-p). The nature of 
sources secured trustworthiness simultaneously increasing validity potential. 
All documents will be analyzed as formulating one whole. Moreover, further 
analysis showed that the EU official discourse was formulated consistently
therefore the persons who formulated the discourse on behalf of the EU were 
not of particular importance; though in itself it was an interesting 
observation about efficiency of cooperation between the EU institutions in 
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that foreign policy case. The documents were organized chronologically 
serving the analytical purpose to follow the key events of the negotiation 
process.
As the next step, media sources were collected on the basis of their long-
term international credibility and linguistic abilities of the researcher: 11 
articles from BBC, Telegraph and the Guardian, FT, and EuBusiness (a-k).
Ideally, they could have been contrasted to the addresses, say, in the French 
or Germen media. However, this is only a marginal caveat since the primary 
aim is not to highlight the differences in the individual member-states 
discourses.
b). The Russian Discourse (Annex 2)
This followed the same logic scanning the databases of the Russian 
President Dmitry Medvedev (www.kremlin.ru), The Russian Foreign Minister 
Sergey Lavrov (www.mid.ru), and the Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin 
(www.premier.gov.ru): total of 24 documents represented by interviews and 
official addresses (a-x). Notably many of the addresses made by Sarkozy in 
Moscow will be found in the Russian sample.
The media sources were added to balance the EU sample and were used 
mainly to assess chronology of the conflict: Lenta.ru which is the internet 
information resource (part of Rambler Media Group) licensed by the Russian 
Ministry of Copyright (1999-2009), NTV which is one of the biggest Russian 
broadcasting channels, and Vzglead - one of the biggest business newspapers: 
coverage annexed in 4 documents (a-d).
2.3.4. Quality Check: generalization, validity, reliability
A case study is always followed by generalization concern: how should the 
case of the Russian-Georgian conflict be extended to other contexts? The 
possibility of this is debatable due to probabilistic results of the aggregates 
from the study (Gomm et al. 2000: 9) and the fact that some influential 
variables will always remain neglected to make the study ‘do-able’.
In general, multidimensional nature of causation in the social world would 
always impose its limits. The task of such kind of study is to offer 
“transferability” as opposed to fundamental generalization (Gomm et al., 
2000). It will generate some probabilistic propositions and expand existing 
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concepts (Yin, 2003: 10). Primary goal thus is to provide several analytical 
assumptions and hypotheses relevant to testing in further studies. 
When it comes to validity, the central question is whether an indicator is 
deployed to measure the concept it is intended to measure (Babbie et al 
2007: 15-17). Particularly qualitative research involves the social 
constitution of the author in the study, hence would always be challenged on 
the accounts of whether or not one sees what he thinks he sees (Flick 2006: 
371). Validity can be approached through alternative criteria: 
trustworthiness and authenticity of the information gathered and produced 
(Bryman, 2004, Flick 2006: 373). This study capitalizes on the opportunity to 
relate to the official documents found in the official databases that 
correspond to the task of the research.   
Reliability checks the quality of a measuring instrument by asking if the 
same results would derive again form the same method (Babbie et. al. 2007). 
Reliability is another difficult criterion in qualitative research, due to the 
presence of an individual researcher in the study. Yet it may address the 
quality of the issue and the theory of the study and can be increased through 
high quality collection and interpretation of material (Flick 2006). 
There are, of course limitations of not directly quantifiable or comparable 
data, as well as the fact that some data have been missed out. However, the
analysis is based on considerable amount of official data surrounding the 
conflict, and fits perfectly the timing and major events. The data is reviewable 
and carefully documented in the Annex 1 and Annex 2. The media sources
have been selected critically. All of the data was carefully analyzed against 
itself and against the theoretical framework. 
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Chapter III 
The Impact of the EU on the Russian 
Discourse
3.1. Introduction
The ‘strategists’ behind the outbreak of bombardments of the South 
Ossetian (SO) capital of Tskhinvali on the night of August 7-8 2008, with the 
Georgian President Michael Saakashvili ahead of the operation, remind a 
group of dilettanti script-writers in the theater of absurd that settled for a 
very bad plot. It entailed a sacrifice of too many innocent lives. A quick 
glimpse on the map, and a thought or two about the parties directly involved 
in the military operations - Georgia and Russia (which Mr. Saakashvili 
seemed to have neglected) – puzzles an independent observer: Whatever the 
reasons behind the outbreak of the conflict, what did Mr. President expect? 
The territory of South Ossetia is adjusted to Russia both via its borders 
and the role that Russia proclaimed itself to play in the Region decades ago. 
Whatever the motives, such straightforward aggression could not have been 
left unrewarded. And it was not. Russia is a big country, and it is known to act 
big, too. Or at least when it comes to stepping on its blisters. The situation in 
Georgia is one of those painful ‘frozen conflicts’ inherited from the Soviet 
Union legacy (Medvedev 2008a.g, Putin 2008n). Yet, even though a good look 
from aside could have altered Mr. Saakashvili’s decision on the memorable 
night in his career, it is much too late to offer a hand for his political 
decadence.  Neither is it the scope of this study. 
Perhaps, one thing President Saakashvili planned rather well was the 
factor of surprise. The conflict, the timing, the logic, the strategy – all of it 
surprised greatly. It also angered Moscow quite the lot (see e.g. Putin quoted 
in FT 2008f).  In principle, it may have escalated to a much more severe and 
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disturbing condition (Council 2008f). However, it also created instant 
resonance in Brussels (Council 2008a.b). The European Union that in 
contrast to NATO could increasingly be accounted for in the sharp-edged 
political frameworks engaged into active and persistent negotiation process 
with Russia emerging as the broker of a ceasefire agreement and the 
guarantor of peace in Georgia.  It has not solved all the problems of course, 
yet through its discourse the EU managed to persuade Russia to reformulate 
some of its positions, on Georgia and on the EU itself. 
Its impact, nevertheless, was opportunistic on some accounts and limited 
on others, which could be extended to several characteristics of the EU 
‘actorness’ in foreign policy: the contextual nature, the ‘soft’ rationality in the 
decision-making, and the importance of representation in the EU leadership.  
Without these factors the understanding of the EU effect on the Russian 
behavior is limited. Similarly, without understanding the effect, it is hard to 
extract these factors. This essay starts with the impact and drives to the 
broader assumptions of the EU ‘actorness’.
3.1.1. The Discourses
It is useful to remind the definition of discourses to be analyzed, and their 
order.
There are two major discourses: The EU and the Russian official 
discourses represented as official texts (statements, press-releases, 
interviews), and the texts extracted from the media that will be used 
interchangeably formulating the analytical whole. The period covered is the 
negotiation process between the EU and Russia from the outbreak of the 
conflict on August 8 2008 until October 21 2008 when the key agreement 
brokered by the Council Presidency, the ‘Sarkozy - Medvedev Agreement’, 
was confirmed as implemented.
Both discourses are represented as carriers of constructive change but 
also as reflection of a series of action. The texts are directly related to the 
political reality of the discourses because they are in themselves 
representations of how the politicians interpret their political environments. 
It is important that the discursive practices, or the other discourses 
surrounding the official discourses, also derive from those texts.   
The conflict was a unique and unpredictable occasion. Hence, the first step 
of the analysis settles for the logical structure of the two discourses. It will 
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start with the outline of basic discourses of Russia and the EU and 
subsequently asses their interaction resulting into two narratives: ‘Sharing 
Competencies in the Caucasus’ and ‘The New Security Architecture?’.
Secondly, those narratives would be tested for change implying that the 
interest formation on the both sides is not static but prone to change. 
3.1.2. Analytical Categories 
Before commencing with the analysis in the Chapter 3 it is important to 
‘make sense’ of the categories that the discourse analysis is based on. They 
related to what the data could offer and to the theoretical considerations in 
line with the question I of the study:
I. What was the impact of the EU discourse on the Russian behavior? 
The analysis will commence with parallel assessment of the Russian and 
the EU perceptions of the conflict in terms of actors involved including 
own role, and their threats and priorities. This will help to elucidate the 
narratives (the same interests/strategies approached from two different 
perspectives) to subsequently measure how the EU can change the 
Russian discourse.
The second step would be to observe the dynamic change in interaction 
between the two discourses. Firstly, the EU is supposed to exercise some 
soft measures to which Russia must react; secondly, it must be able to 
effectuate constructive change to accommodate its principles, as the logic 
implies.
Entire chapter deals with the narrow context of the EU and Russian 
discourse around the conflict from August 8 2008 to October 21 2008. 
The analysis is the representation of the general findings of all aggregate 
material and represents subjective interpretation of the author.
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3.2. Dominant Discourses and Formulation of 
Narratives
Throughout the texts, it is possible to identify consistent discourses that 
formulate structural understanding of the relationship between the EU and 
the Russian discourses (Hansen 2006). These discourses will indicate some 
key narratives that will be tried for change under the EU impact in the 
subsequent section. This also relates to dialectics – the process of studying 
different positions without necessarily claiming to explain reality – to 
provide for the subsequent step of observing the interactive process between 
the two discourses.
3.2.1. Russia:  Perceptions of the Conflict and Own Influence
I. Georgia, SO and the EU as a part of international community
The Russian discourse is represented by immediate reaction of the Prime 
Minister Vladimir Putin and President Dmitry Medvedev followed by the 
Minister for Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov, and is generally very consistent. 
Whilst reifying active presence of both Georgia as an aggressor and South 
Ossetia as a victim,  persistent is positive image about Georgia as a country 
very close to Russia in all senses, the ‘neighbor’ and ‘friend’. The Georgian 
population is seen as a ‘brotherhood’ nation. Same historical pattern is used 
in reference to SO which has long been different in cultural and political 
sense from Georgia (Putin 2008o, Medvedev 2008a.b.d-h, Lavrov 2008p.q). 
The discourse indicates ‘with one voice’ that the accountability for the 
conflict rests on the shoulders of the Georgian President Saakashvili as 
incompetent and dangerous politician, provocateur of the nasty operation 
supported, although perhaps unwittingly, by the US. (see e.g. Lavrov 2008q-v, 
Medvedev on NTV 2008c). (This point remarkably found its evidence with 
latter developments, BBC 2008c). Concerning the Georgian territorial 
integrity, however, the Georgian President himself buried all hopes (e.g. Putin 
2008o).
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The international community appears on the one hand, guilty of the 
Georgian militarization process by selling arms and training Georgian 
militants. Georgia could have been pressured on disarmament but it was not. 
The Foreign Minister Lavrov encouraged “to pay, at last, attention…to 
massive purchases of offensive armaments” by Georgia (quote from Lavrov 
2008p, own translation). Very few states including some members of the 
European community, added Lavrov, answered the Russian plead to control 
the situation: “we frankly speaking cannot avoid noticing that those who 
ignored our warnings … should be at least part of the responsibility for what 
is going on” (ibid.). 
The image of the EU is equated to the rest of the international community
– the other. In reference to its relations with Georgia there is a bit of irony:
“Mr. Saakashvili is talking on TV every now and then at the background not 
only of the Georgian flag, but also of the EU flag. I asked yesterday the 
representative of the EU presidency, whether this was the practice for the EU 
flag to be used by whoever basically wants to use it and the answer was ‘no’. I 
was told that they would 
look into the legal aspects 
of the problem” (Lavrov
2008q). Same question was 
posed latter by a BBC 
reporter to President 
Sarkozy who limited his 
response to ‘clarifying’ that 
Georgia was not in the EU
(Sarkozy in Medvedev 
2008d).
On the other hand, the 
international community downplays the principles of the rule of law and 
democracy by applying double-standards, implicitly referring to Kosovo (e.g. 
Medvedev 2008g).
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II. Perceptions of Own Role
Throughout the texts Russia emphasized own compelled presence in the 
war. Russian behavior should be understood according to the circumstances 
of blunt military provocation (see e.g. in Medvedev 2008a-n, Lavrov 2008p-x, 
Putin 2008o, NTV 2008d).
The ‘geo-politics’ of the initial Russian discourse is very interesting. It 
suggests that on the post-Soviet territory Russia is both ex-ante and ex-post
power. Putin mentions NIS3, the states that are clearly most dependent on 
Russia in many respects, urging them to take efforts to stop military actions 
from the Georgian side (Vzglead 2008d, Putin 2008o). Putin clarified, “we are 
not planning to thrust anything on anybody. We understand perfectly well 
the world we live in. 
We will strive for 
just, peaceful 
settlement of all 
conflict situations we 
inherited from the 
past” (Putin 2008o,
own translation). 
Overall, Russia 
uses actively history 
of the region setting 
straight that its own 
involvement is 
inevitable and not only desirable but derives out of responsibility to protect 
peace in the zones of the ‘frozen conflicts’. In some way, the Russian 
discourse consciously reifies the ironic ‘Western’ picture of the big Russian 
bear and the teasing child – Georgia. Russia consistently specifies the fact that 
the Georgian political provocation, such as arresting the Russian staff, has 
lasted for several years spilling finally the last drop (see e.g. Lavrov 2008s).  
When it comes to power, Russia is friends with Georgia, yet it is determined 
to take over political control of its post-Soviet legacy.
Secondly, Russia is feeling well, or finds itself steadily, as the close outsider 
in a Euro-centric order – while not being conceivably ‘in’, Russia and the EU 
are tied up to feel each other’s presence (Aalto 2006). Medvedev emphasized 
                                                          
3 Newly Independent States, countries that until 1991 were constituent republics of the USSR, including 
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, 
Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. The term can also include Russia and sometimes Estonia, Latvia, and 
Lithuania
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the fact that Russia is used to political pressure from the outside (Medvedev 
2008g). Yet, the definitive position is that of the EU being closer to the 
American continent than to Russia. 
That also means that Russia sets its own rules of the game, by which it is 
determined to play. Russia has its vision of the rule of law and justice in 
security terms. The position for the Europeans and the West, as Lavrov put it, 
should be to understand the Russian principles (e.g. in Lavrov 2008q).
The Russian way to conduct ‘foreign policy’ has almost conventionally 
been criticized as a concentric circle demonstrating superiority in military 
terms (e.g. in Johnson, Robinson 2005, Krastev 2008). But unpredictable in 
the Russian discourse was not what Russia did, but to what extent Russia 
intended to deploy its military pressure on Georgia, and how strong it 
identified with its sphere of influence. 
The fact that Russia, as any other state, has its own stakes is not novice. Of 
course, it would impose its limits on the EU. The question is to what extent 
will the EU be able to change Russia’s claim to own sphere of influence in 
Georgia and the tactics it would choose to deploy.
3.2.2. The EU: Perceptions of the Conflict and Own Influence
I. Perceptions of Russia, Georgia and SO
The EU discourse starts with “grave concern” on deterioration of the 
situation in ‘South Ossetia (Georgia) and the “disproportionate reaction of 
Russia” (Council 2008a-c) towards what can be summarized in the speech of 
Pöttering: “Although it is clear that in launching military action on the South 
Ossetian town of Tskhinvali the President of Georgia made a serious mistake, 
there is no justification whatsoever for Russia's response” (Pöttering 2008i). 
The EU takes a smart diplomatic position – it does not directly blame 
Russia for the war, but for disproportionate reaction and force. Albeit in 
some addresses the words like invasion by Russia of the sovereign state are 
present (ibid.), Sarkozy does not bring direct accusations to Moscow (see e.g. 
Sarkozy in Medvedev 2008c.d, Sarkozy 2008d). President Medvedev 
mentioned in almost all his addresses regret about the inconsistency of the 
Russian and the EU positions on outbreak of the war, yet it did not appear a 
stumbling block for negotiations. 
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Interesting is also recurring emphasis on the Russian military in Georgia 
and only marginal mention of the Georgian military in South Ossetia, which 
nevertheless is included as one of the points in the Medvedev - Sarkozy plan. 
Yet, if Russia wants Georgia out of SO definitively, the EU is emphasizing 
Russia out of Georgia (Council 2008c).
II. Representation, and Perceptions of Own Role
The EU is consistently representative of the 27 member-states. Constant is 
the role of the Presidency that by mandate represented the EU in Moscow 
especially active throughout face-to-face negotiations with the Russian 
President Medvedev (see e.g. Sarkozy 2008d, Medvedev 2008b-d.l.m, 
EUbusiness 2008e, FT 2008f). Hence, the EU opinion in Moscow is coupled 
with France.  In the interviews at the joint press conference held by 
Medvedev and Sarkozy both parties emphasize their personal close 
cooperation though “phone calls” and frequent meetings (Medvedev 2008b-
d). It does not, however, jeopardize the capacity of the French President to 
speak on the Union’s behalf. For instance, Sarkozy speaks of the Polish 
decision to personally support Saakashvili in Georgia: “I cannot reproach the 
Poles, the President of Poland for his initiatives and the minister for foreign 
affairs for going (to Georgia). As you know, several other leaders also went 
there...And I am determined to preserve and support the European unity”
(own translation, Sarkozy in Medvedev 2008d, italics added).
Similarly, he persists with polite and respectful note in Moscow and 
Brussels, being welcomed with political warmth in Kremlin. In general it 
seems like the two leaders matched perfectly.  
The role of the EU is first expressed as the mediating efforts (Council 
2008a.b), and extended to long-term commitment to sustain peace in Georgia
“including through a presence on the ground, to support every effort to 
secure a peaceful and lasting solution to the conflict in Georgia” (Council 
2008c) and ensure the full implementation of the Sarkozy - Medvedev  
agreement, which is latter reified by Pottering as “decisive test of our political 
cohesiveness” (Pöttering 2008i) and credibility of the EU as not only the
“observer or a mediator”, but what seems to be the  guarantor of all possible 
‘good’ values. Taking in account how the EU defines those values (the rule of 
law, the right for own territory, human rights, peace, life etc.) the point seems 
overemphasized as if Russia was a political beast from some other parallel 
reality where common sense does not really exist. 
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To note, Pöttering takes things very close at heart in this conflict. He 
recalls his visits to the Baltic States where people “remember only too well 
the tragic periods in their history which were marked by foreign rule, 
violence and terrorism”, obviously referring to Communism as terrorist 
regime. He goes on: “You are no longer alone! A threat to your country would 
constitute a threat to the European Union as a whole…If we fail to meet our 
joint responsibility today then Russia might act in the same way towards 
other States” (ibid.).
The fact that Pöttering personally, as the President of the EP, had only 
marginal role in the EU discourse in Moscow probably was a strong card for 
the EU itself. It is no secret for Russia that the ‘West’ identifies it with a type 
of Communist regime.  No one likes his predecessors to be called terrorists, 
especially when Russia is involved in preserving global security.
3.2.3. Russia: Threats and Priorities
The threats, just as the role, presented by Russia are immediate, and long-
standing - broad and deep regarding the implications of such conflict in the 
Caucasus. They relate to the logic in the first category, therefore will be 
elaborated in brief.
The foremost priority is to protect own citizens and peacekeepers, to stop 
the Georgian invasion of SO, and subsequently Abkhazia, to restore peace and 
secure aid to SO (Putin 2008o, Medvedev 2008a.c.g.h.n, Lavrov 2008p-x). The 
Georgian troops must leave Southern Ossetia and the positions which they 
can use to continue attacks, definitively. Georgia has to sign a judicial pact on 
non-use of power (Lavrov 2008p-r). 
Lavrov clarified in normative terms:  “Russia’s aim is to keep peace. This is 
not just Russia’s aim, this is Russia’s obligation” (Lavrov 2008q). This is the 
overall picture recurring most in the Russian discourse. 
Secondly, the parallels are made to Armenia and Azerbaijan, and the 
terrorist groupings in Tajikistan and Chechnya. 
Russian priorities are also ‘principled’. Yet it seems peace and justice 
should be measured through the Russian prism. They are usually coupled 
with the rhetoric that the aggressor should be ‘punished’. Unwittingly, 
although exaggerated of course, it reminds of immortal Dostoyevsky’s ‘Crime 
and Punishment’: the old money-lender Alyona was, indeed, very unpleasant 
but did she, and her sister who unfortunately witnessed the procedure, really 
deserve death? The officials emphasized determination to “protect the life 
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and dignity of the Russian citizens wherever they are” by punishing “the 
guilty as deserved” (own translation, Medvedev, 2008a). 
3.2.4. The EU: Threats and Priorities
The EU discourse shows great unity and demonstrates its ‘principled’ 
agenda from the first official address on August 13 through the whole 
covered period by stating “the absolute priority…to stop the suffering and 
bring the fighting to an end” (Council 2008b). It goes on: “military action of 
this kind is not a solution and is not acceptable”.  The Council “deplores the 
loss of human life”, “the suffering”, “displaced persons and refugees, and the 
considerable material damage” (Council 2008c) emphasizing throughout the 
discourse “peaceful and lasting solution…on full respect for the principles of 
independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity recognised by 
international law and UN Security Council resolutions” (Council 2008b).
So, the first priority is immediate cessation of military action.  Secondly, 
Georgian territorial integrity must be preserved as “European States have the 
right freely to determine their foreign policy and their alliances, while 
respecting international law and the principles of good neighbourliness and 
peaceful cooperation” (Council 2008c).
Just as Russia refers to the effect of the conflict in the region, the EU finds 
own parallels via stepping up its neighbourhood policy, the development of 
the ‘Black Sea Synergy’ initiative and an ‘Eastern Partnership’ (ibid.) 
extending own concern with, for example Ukraine and Moldova (Pöttering, 
2008i) - the ‘dangerous’ post-Soviet sphere.
Closer to the end of the key post-emergency summit, the EU outlines what 
seem to be its vital long-term priorities that are present though the whole 
studied period: security of energy supplies, and, most importantly, the 
“crossroads” of the EU-Russia relations, which is to be “fundamental choice” 
for “mutual interest, understanding and cooperation” on the basis of 
“responsible manner” from Russia. The EU is “willing to engage in 
partnership and cooperation, in keeping with the principles and values on 
which it is based” (Council 2008c). The exact terminology of principles except 
for all-encompassing values is obviously to be decided in process of this 
cooperation.
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Box 2: Findings of Parallel Analysis
RUSSIA The EU
PERCEPTIONS:
GEO-POLITICAL The Russian Sphere of 
Influence, EU as 
representative of ‘West’, 
or Other
European and 
International, EU as a 
Supranational Agent for 
Peace
GOAL Regional stability, 
Georgia out of SO
Regional stability, 
Russia out of Georgia
FOCUS Georgia, SO, Abkhazia Georgia
MEANS Coercive Diplomatic
INTEREST Demobilizing the 
Aggressor
Peace Mediation
CORRELATION
CONTRAST
Strategic territorial interest
Tactical difference
3.2.5. Formulation of Narratives
The observation of the EU and the Russian discourses allows to assume 
the following: the EU and Russia share strategic territorial interest (the 
Caucasus), the conflict within which enacted the process approached though 
the mutual goal of implementing ‘peace’ an ‘justice’, yet with own 
underpinning of how they should be secured. There is a strategic correlation 
but a tactical difference.
In the above context one may recall the Laeken Declaration, European 
Council, 2001 (cited in Lucarelli, Manners 2006: 3):
Does Europe not, now that is finally unified, have a leading role to play in the 
new world order, that of a power able both to play a stabilizing role worldwide 
and to point the way ahead for many countries and peoples?
So, the role of the EU, reified by the discourse, is one of “dealing with (…) 
abuse of power, establishing the rule of law and protecting human rights” as
“the best means of international order” (European Council 2003). 
Apart from how, here is also a tempting ‘who’ should secure peace in 
Georgia. For Russia it is clearly its own sphere of influence. The EU does not 
think so.
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Thus the two narratives for the study of the EU impact could be 
formulated: ‘Sharing Competencies in the Caucasus’ and ‘The New Security
Architecture?’. These two narratives will be measured in the second part of 
the next section, after the observations of impact of the EU measures on the 
Russian behavior have been outlined. 
3.3. The Impact of the EU Measures
How to assess the fact that the EU managed to re-account some of Russia’s 
ends and means? This category starts with the EU impact in interaction with 
the Russian discourse though the implementation of the EU measures to 
provide ground for subsequent test of change within the Russian narratives.
Obviously, after stating its positions, the EU implemented some measures, 
more or less successful in relation to the context of Russia and measured 
rationality of the member-states in this process. 
The measures are important not only because they demonstrate which 
tools the EU is able to deploy setting the EU in context of its civil and 
normative power, they also most vividly demonstrate the ‘angry voices’, or 
the displeased member states in process of the EU discourse formation in 
particular case. 
Important, that not all but only the measures that may have implications 
for the Russian behavior will be outlined. The measures of the EU are both 
the outcome of its discourse and a series of reasonable actions, thus, will 
relate to chronology in the discourses. 
3.3.1. Diplomatic Efforts
I. First Diplomatic Success
Major EU undertaking relates to the conflict management efforts via 
political dialogue and mediation. It is reflected in the ‘Sarkozy - Medvedev 
Agreement’ of August 12 2008, which is the central element throughout both 
discourses (Council 2008c, Medvedev 2008d):
1) Not to resort to force; 
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2) To end hostilities definitively; 
3) To provide free access for humanitarian aid; 
4) Georgian military forces will have to withdraw to their usual bases;
5) Russian military forces will have to withdraw to the lines held prior to the 
outbreak of hostilities. Pending an international mechanism, Russian peace-
keeping forces will implement additional security measures; 
6) Opening of international talks on the security and stability arrangements 
in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. 
The first three points implemented after 5 days of the outbreak of the 
conflict related to the EU stated commitment to stop hostilities and the 
Russian commitment to protect own citizens and demobilize the aggressor. 
The fourth and the fifth, however, were not as straightforward. Firstly, Russia 
was serious about the removal of all Georgian militants: “if the Georgian 
side…withdraws the military to the initial positions…then the path to 
incremental normalization…would be open. It is up to Tbilisi” (own 
translation, Medvedev 2008d). Moscow created the ‘buffer zones’ along the 
borders of SO and Abkhazia and insisted to stay there referring to prior 
international agreements – the dark area of the Sarkozy - Medvedev deal. 
II. Effectuated Dynamics
Obviously, these two points bared strategic importance both for Russia 
and the EU. For Russia it meant sharing its sphere of influence with 
international control mechanisms. For the EU, own monitors instead of the 
Russian military forces ahead of OSCE or any other observers meant for the 
first time actually playing a role in interrupting the cycle of conflict (K. Smith
2003: 167) without resorting to inexistent military force, strictly speaking. 
In the meantime the Russian discourse formulated another important step 
– unilateral decision to recognize the independence of SO and Abkhazia on 
August 26, 2008 presented as the only viable solution to prevent further 
‘genocide’ on those territories (Medvedev 2008e-j). However, except of the 
opportunity to solve one two-decades-old ‘frozen conflict’ there may have 
been another factor formulated by the pressure of the EU discourse –
Moscow may have been taken aback not only by the conflict itself but also by 
the EU persistence of pushing Russia out of Georgia. BBC published the 
opinion of the president of the New Eurasia Foundation, Andrei Kotunov: “I 
don't think Russia had any plan or master design for this conflict…was 
reacting, and improvising - probably not always successfully” (BBC 2008b). 
By the end of August it became clear the EU seriously targeted own 
presence in Georgia, which has been visibly inclining to the ‘West’. 
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Inevitability of ‘foreign’ presence may have rushed Moscow’s decision, which 
also breezes with acceptance of the EU presence.
III. Second Diplomatic Success
The next EU diplomatic triumph followed on September 8 in the 
Mayendorff presidential residence near Moscow, one month after the 
outbreak of hostilities, when the Presidency managed to establish clear-cut 
provisions for the ‘fishy’ zone: the removal of the checkpoints between Poti 
and Senaki in one week (see map), and complete withdrawal of the Russian 
military forces from Georgian territory outside South Ossetia and Abkhazia in 
condition of complete removal of Georgian forces from SO, the guarantee of 
non-use of force towards SO and Abkhazia, finally, with the EU commitment 
to deploy 200 observers before 1 October 2008 to Georgia instead of the 
Russian military forces, all of which was effectively implemented (Medvedev 
2008m, Council 2008n, Solana 2008j.k.l). 
The withdrawal of the Russian troops was confirmed by EUMM 
monitoring mission and by Solana on October 8 2008 – two month after the 
outbreak of the war (Solana 2008l.m).  
Finally, point number six in the agreement related to bridging political 
dialogue between EU and Russia. It has its own value for further analysis of 
the study.
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3.3.2. Civilian Measures
I. Mediation
This leads to verification of the EU civilian power – the establishment on 
October 1 of the EU monitoring mission to Georgia (EUMM) under ESDP with 
350 staff, over 200 monitors and a EUR 35 million budget to monitor the 
implementation of the Agreement and further state of affairs in Georgia, 
including the fact-finding mission’ initially for the period of 12 months. It is 
the fastest deployment that the EU has ever undertaken and serves three 
major purposes: stabilization, normalization and confidence-building 
applicable to the ‘key-words’ such as human rights and international 
humanitarian law, governance, rule of law, and public order, as well as 
practical security of transportation links, energy infrastructures and the 
return of internally displaced persons and refugees (Solana 2008j). Thus it is 
also ‘principled’ and the EU-role oriented, to “bring a sense of security to the 
people” demonstrating the EU “capacity to act with determination and speed” 
(ibid).
II. Sanctions and Regional Cooperation
The question of sanctions is very important in the EU discourse. This was 
the major point of contestation in process of the EU discourse formation.
Through August until the beginning of September the question of the 
Russian troops remained factually open. This enacted another measure –
diplomatic sanctions on Russia via suspending the new partnership 
agreement, which Medvedev appreciated as a rational move (ex. Medvedev 
2008i). Economic sanctions which were pushed strongly by the UK, Poland, 
the Baltic States did not receive any factual value under the pressure of 
France, Germany and Italy (Brown 2008d, Eubusiness 2008e, Telegraph 
2008h.j), which will be discussed further.
As to regional cooperation, the EU committed to ‘stepping-up’ of the 
relationship in the neighborhood through the Black Sea Synergy and the 
Neighborhood Policy (Council 2008c), which would be further discussed in 
the framework of the opening for the EU expansion policy.
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III. Financial and Humanitarian 
The strongest asset of the EU in conflict solving has always been its 
economic power (cf K. Smith 2003, Manners, Lucarelli eds. 2006, Bretherton, 
Vogler 2006). Particular case is no stranger; the discourse emphasizes the EU 
Commission’s rapid preliminary humanitarian aid concentrating on
Internally Displaced People (IDPs) and infrastructure damage. Together with 
the World Bank/UN Joint Needs Assessment mission (JNA) it focused on 
Georgian economic recovery.  It also settled for a package of EUR 500M over 
three years for post-conflict recovery, as well as enacted such international 
mechanisms as the Donor’s Conference for Georgia (Barroso 2008o). 
Particular measure does not directly support the research problem, yet it 
reifies the EU solid status as the civil and humanitarian power.
3.3.3. ‘Angry Voices’ Echoing EU Approach
The ‘angry voices’ reacted to two major events in process of the 
EU/Russian discourse dynamics: delayed removal of the Russian forces from 
Georgia (point 5 of the Agreement), and the Russian decision to recognize SO 
and Abkhazia. The Russian response signaled irrevocability: “We pay 
attention to the position of our partners, but in this situation another thing is 
important: to protect the interest of the people who live in South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia” (own translation, Medvedev 2008m).
Albeit the EU showed strong unity condemning the Russian territorial 
regrouping in Georgia, it equally strongly disagreed on the approach to 
Russia. 
The dichotomy in the EU discourse demonstrates certain historical pattern 
reminding the clash of interests over the war in Iraq in 2003, however, this 
time negotiations continued full-speed and succeeded in bringing results.
The UK and Poland, the Baltic States, to some extent the Check Republic 
pushed for “root and brunch” review of the relationships with Russia (Brown
2008d) including economic sanctions such as blocking Russia in G8, OECD 
and WTO negotiations, and other such as boycott of the 2014 Winter 
Olympics in the Russian city near the Georgian border, Sochi (Telegraph 
2008h). Mr. Brown also managed to ‘reflect’ on NATO positions, stressing re-
evaluation of the “alliance's relationship with Russia” (Brown 2008d).
France, Italy and Germany obviously accounted for own context and 
expressed very different positions insisting that Russian was not a “hostile”
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country, coupled with caution not to “aggravate” Russia in sidestepping 
sanction demands emphasizing the importance to substitute the term with 
“dialogue”: “Either we want to re-launch the Cold War, point our finger at 
Russia, isolate it and stamp on it as was the case for a decade…or we choose 
the option of dialogue” (F. Fillon cited at Telegraph 2008h). 
The members of the European Parliament contribute to this dichotomy. 
Bulgarian representative appreciated the Sarkozy approach as “timely, 
balanced, and mature”, while the Polish MEP contested that the EU can either 
be satisfied with verbal action, or make Russia obey its rules. French 
representative was “pleasantly surprised” with the outcome, while Germany 
stressed the importance of “joint EU leadership and a common flag”, and 
Belgium evoked “more cooperation, not more confrontation” (Parliament 
2008h).  
Box 3: Dynamics under the Impact of the EU Measures
MEANS OUTCOME CHANGE NO CHANGE
DIPLOMATIC Sarkozy-Medvedev 
Agreement
Russian 
commitment to 
withdrawal of 
forces, with EU 
substituting the 
Russian
Recognition of 
Independence of 
SO and Abchazia
CIVIL EUMM Acceptance of the 
EU presence in 
Georgia by 
Russia
Outcome: 
divisions of 
interests in the 
EU discourse
It is crucial to keep in mind the measures and this dichotomy in the EU 
discourse for subsequent analysis: firstly, it may help understand the effect of 
the EU discourse on the Russian behavior with its limitations and 
possibilities in the following part, which will observe the two narratives 
elaborated previously: ‘Sharing Competencies in the Caucasus’ and ‘The New 
Security Architecture?’. Secondly, it provides the empirical grounds for 
subsequent opening in the Chapter IV of the essay: the importance of context 
in the EU FP, and the importance of measured rationality (textbox 1) of the 
EU members both against each other and the framework of the EU.
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3.4. The Impact on the Narratives: 
                Russia and the EU: The New Architecture?
If Russia is to be visualized as the big brown bear, then Georgia is a bee-
nest, or at least a nest for economic and political challenges. Yet, the Caucasus
is obviously of strategic importance both for the East and the West Europe. 
One of the major underpinnings in the EU discourse looking into the future 
should be penetrating in the Russian ‘sphere of influence’. 
Subsequent part will measure how the EU discourse in line with its 
principles, interests and contextual limitations facilitated change in the 
Russian discourse following the two narratives: ‘Sharing Competencies in the 
Caucasus’ and ‘The New Security Architecture?’. It will also discuss possible 
implication for the EU as a constantly evolving FP actor.
3.4.1. Narrative 1 - Sharing competencies in the Caucasus
The EU discourse formulated a clear message that the conflict in Georgia 
was not only within the Russian competence but the matter of regional and 
international importance in the fate of which the EU was determined to take 
part: “The EU is here in Georgia to work for the stability of the country. Our 
engagement is serious” (Solana 2008j).
Sarkozy made an elegant entrance in Moscow (own translation, Sarkozy in 
Medvedev 2008c): 
Europe thinks that Russia is a great power and is able to understand that the 
last decades have been uneasy for Russia in the world, which needs Russia for 
peace and security...There are two ways to solve the problem: to look back, but 
we will not find a solution, or we look forward and try to find this 
solution...what France and what Europe wants – is peace. And we will make all
efforts to reach this goal…. 
Medvedev, obviously, was determined to look forward: “We see in the 
European Union our natural partners, our key partners” (Medvedev 2008m).  
Of course, Russia will always trace it own interest just as the EU will, as
Sarkozy put it (Sarkozy in Medvedev 2008c), the important achievement is 
that the EU, regardless of the ‘angry voices’, found a tactical coincidence 
reifying itself as a skillful negotiator, which facilitated further cooperation. 
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One of the most obvious changes in the Russian discourse is the switch of 
the EU from being a part of the international community that ‘failed’ Georgia 
to the distinct guarantor for peace in Georgia. Moreover, the EU soothed 
initial Russian aggression against Georgian actions. What can this change 
signify?
I. Credibility and Stability
The Russian discourse secured several strategic positions: demonstrated 
the will and ability to protect its citizens, demobilized the aggressor, and 
recognized the birth of two states of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. However, it 
remarkably stepped out of Georgia on the grounds that “particularly” the EU 
stepped in (Lavrov 2008v). 
This signifies one important element that has never characterized the EU-
Russia relations – the sense of measured credibility in Moscow. The EU 
emerged first as a mediator between the two conflicting sides, then as the 
“guarantor for peace” in Georgia – the stability would then depend on the EU: 
“We very much hope that now when the EU became the guarantor regarding 
the actions of the Georgian side, Georgia, and the Georgian government will 
implement their obligations” (ibid). 
The discourse expends the notion further concerning relationships with the 
EU which have been guided by fair 
judgment and “maximal openness”
that Russia hopes to be reciprocal 
(Lavrov 2008v, Medvedev 2008m.n).
In a way Moscow accepted it was 
time to build a new relationship with 
the EU in the Caucasus offering the 
“new security architecture”
(Medvedev 2008j). It seems that 
maintaining regional monopoly lost 
its attractiveness.  Especially since 
Russia does not want (neither it 
possible) to isolate itself from the 
‘West’ in political terms, as Medvedev 
consistently stated (Medvedev 
2008j.m.n). The Russian discourse 
confirms one important finding – the 
EU is not NATO, although some parallels exist. The EU is not necessarily, and 
…when Mr. Sarkozy flew to Moscow 
on August 12 for emergency talks 
with Dmitry Medvedev, the Russian 
president, and Mr. Putin a few days 
after the conflict began, Mr. Putin 
told him: “I want to hang Saakashvili 
by the balls.”
“Hang him?” a startled Mr. Sarkozy 
interjected.
“Why not,” Mr. Putin replied. “The 
Americans hanged Saddam Hussein.”
“But do you want to end up like 
[George W.] Bush?” Mr. Sarkozy 
asked.
Mr. Putin apparently paused, and 
said: “Ah, there you have a point.”
Financial Times, ‘French president 
‘soothed’ Putin’s rage’, 14 November 
2008
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increasingly quite contrary, the American ‘watchdog’. Despite own interests, 
the EU is really coming with peace (tracing back to the discussion that the 
‘normative’ power of the EU is stronger in its commitment to stated 
principles – if the EU says it comes with peace and not to isolate Russia, it 
may mean so). It is not in the EU interests, neither it is in the Russian, to fight 
for supremacy of regimes. 
II. The Opening of the regional frontiers?
How can this be one of the greatest EU foreign policy achievements at this 
point?
By receiving Moscow’s approval for its mission for peace in Georgia the EU 
arguably contributed with some assertiveness in the Caucasus to its 
expansionist dilemma.  This does not mean that Georgia should be any closer 
to the EU enlargement agenda. On the contrary, given the disposition of 
affairs it is unlikely that Georgia is on the way to foreseeable enlargement 
prospects. However, the EU is constantly re-mastering its neighborhood 
agenda. 
On December 4 2008 the EU promised an increase of long-term aid to the 
Caucasus, and a ‘partnership package’ for six countries: Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine (Guardian 2008). In this light some 
stability in the region, as well as certain status of the EU, would help take 
further steps. Whatever the reasons, the point of this study was to emphasize 
that the change in this direction was effectuated. 
III. Guarantor for Peace and Agent of Diplomacy
Other intrinsic question derived from the discourse is: how does the EU 
actually define peace? Sarkozy stated:”…the European Union is resolved to 
serve the interests of peace. Since 12 August, we, Mr. Barroso, I myself and 
the French Foreign Minister, Bernard Kouchner, have been working for 
peace” (Sarkozy 2008d). He adds: “…this is a wrong decision – war” (own 
translation in Medvedev 2008m). 
Is peace merely the absence of war, or does it entail the EU ‘principles’, 
except that it is all-encompassing? Without this ‘normative power’ dilemma 
resolved, the analysis renders it hard to measure the change in the Russian 
discourse on this account.
However, there is a difference in the means to achieve peace between the 
EU and Russia – only through diplomacy for the former, and by all means for 
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the latter. Peace for EU is inseparable to diplomatic conflict-solving contrary 
to the Russian ‘punishing’ of the aggressor. The EU is a diplomatic power – a 
specific feature both in its civilian and normative dimension that may itself 
emerge as a ‘power concept’ specific to the EU foreign policy.
If peace means re-accounting of future means, then there is no substantive 
argument in the Russian discourse for change, except the fact that it stepped 
out of one particular territory – Georgia - to allow the EU exercise own 
measures. If it is the absence of conflict the Russian discourse met the 
suggestion as welcoming. Medvedev’s position in response to the EU 
discourse was rather frank – Russia will be interested in cooperation in the 
Caucasus and will not be interested to see military provocations against itself 
in Georgia.  Whilst establishing its presence in Georgia as the guarantor for 
peace, thus non-use of force, the EU may decrease further American 
provocation in the region, guessing the Russian logic. This is tentative but 
interesting for further investigation in light of current NATO endeavors in 
Georgia.
3.4.2. Narrative 2 – The New Security Architecture?
After the conflict in Georgia President Medvedev formulated 5 ‘positions’ 
for his future conduct of foreign policy presented in an interview on August 
31. The were developed in conjunction with the proposition for a new 
“security architecture” in Europe (Medvedev 2008n). Briefly the positions 
can be summarized and interpreted as (Medvedev 2008h):
1) Supremacy of international law defining relationships between 
civilized nations
The fact that Russia decided to ‘institutionalize’ the rule of law as a 
principle in its political rhetoric is good news. The EU’s concern with 
“judiciary modernization” in Russia is genuine as it relates to security of 
trade, for instance (Ferrero-Waldner 2008p). Yet, there is one thing for the 
EU and Russia to decide upon: what exactly is the rule of law? So far in 
foreign policy it has been associated with double-standards on the both sides: 
the EU recognized Kosovo against Russia’s will, but condemned Russia for 
doing the same with Abkhazia and SO. Same goes the other way around.  
2) Multi-polar world. “We can not accept the decisions to be taken by 
one country only, even such a serious and authoritative one as the 
United States of America. This kind of world is unstable…” 
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At the first sight, Russia rejects NATO expansionism and claims own 
interests. Russia does not want NATO military bases at its borders, this is 
clear. 
Simultaneously, after the EU in Georgia Russia feels the need to redefine 
itself within international politics. This relates to the system of cooperation 
and trust, for instance. The Russian discourse repeatedly emphasized the 
gratefulness for involvement and hinted it would be interested in the EU’s 
role in security matters in general (Lavrov 2008v.x). Taking into account that 
Russia’s monopoly in the Caucasus is in danger it would much rather see the 
EU as a foreign policy actors on its outskirts – an actor from the ‘West’ who 
actually, for whatever reasons, talks to Russia without threats and offences. 
This ‘change of heart’ may be beneficial for the EU, too. The US supported 
Saakashvili in committing a crime against civilians - something the EU cannot 
tolerate in its neighborhood. It also stamped Yugoslavia; finally, with Iraq it 
became clear the world is not so ‘peaceful’ under the US leadership. Georgia 
needs a new ‘hand’ and after the interaction with Russia is it possible to 
legitimately offer one. 
3) No confrontation and no isolation. “We will develop as much as 
possible our friendly relations with Europe and with the United States 
of America, and with other countries”
Finally, the EU provided some evidence that Russia has a partner in 
conflict situations, who does not reject the possibility of Russia ending up 
with some benefits. This is an important opening because the point of 
concentric zero-sum games gets lost. ‘No isolation’ may actually become 
something more than rhetoric.
There is also point six in the ‘Sarkozy-Medvedev Agreement’, which settled 
for the new level of international discussions in Geneva since October 15 
2008. While Russia emphasized that it will not reverse its position on the 
recognition of the two new states, Sarkozy pointed that "there is something 
to discuss", and Lavrov conveyed the feeling of “growing interest”, 
“readiness” and the possibility for a “candid talk” (Lavrov 2008x). 
Even if the international conferences most of the times serve to express 
opinions rather than generating binding decisions this is the impact worth 
noting. There is a problem, however, that relates to the first point, the rule of 
law, and the two remaining ones: whose voices, really, will be taken into 
account? Except the EU and Russia, what is the role of South Ossetia and 
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Abkhazia (the talks are, after all, about security in the region), and what is the 
role of the US? 
4) Protection of citizens “wherever they are” and 5) Regional 
Interests
The two remaining categories point to something the EU did not achieve 
and support the argument about its own reflexive discourse, as well as 
reserved rationality in negotiations with Russia – the UK, Poland and the 
Baltic States did not like it to the point they openly supported Saakashvili’s 
policies, yet the discourse did not stumble but continued due to preferences 
more weighty for the EU than Transatlantic tango or ‘historical wounds’. 
The fait accompli of the Russian recognition of sovereignty of Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia to “…secure the life and dignity of those citizens who live in 
South Ossetia”, and prevent “subsequent genocide” remained irreversible 
emphasizing further close cooperation with those regions.
Providing an explanation, Medvedev found his dichotomy of territorial 
sovereignty (own translation, Medvedev 2008d):
What is sovereignty? It is the command of central authority. Does Russia accept the 
Georgian sovereignty? Without a doubt it does …if sovereignty is based on the will of the 
people and the Constitution, than territorial integrity usually shows the real state of affairs. 
It is the will of the people to leave in one state.  
Sarkozy replied (own translation, Sarkozy in Medvedev 2008d): 
We have to exit the crisis…We are in an extreme situation, and our goal is not to solve all 
the problems…Georgia is an independent country, a sovereign country, and I think this 
formula is broader than formulation of territorial integrity. There are two words, 
sovereignty and independence...and they are important. We have to stop the 
sufferings…and we have agreed on the respect for sovereignty. 
All of the above is basically wordplay. The Sarkozy variant does not 
explain how the EU prefers to tractate the “full respect for the principles of 
independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity recognised by 
international law” (Council 2008c), neither does Medvedev’s variant provide 
solid legal grounds for the Russian decision. Overall, it may be fair to assume 
that Sarkozy ‘got the point’ at the negotiation table, somewhere through the 
phone calls, or just by reasonably measuring what such a step back could 
have entailed for Russia’s political esteem. 
By the same token the EU may want Russia to elaborate on what 
“wherever they are” means when it comes to the protection of citizens. 
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Box 4: Impact of the EU Principles on the Russian Discourse
PRINCIPLE BEFORE AFTER
OPENNESS Closed Sphere of 
Influence
Suggestion for multi-
polarity in the Russian 
discourse
CREDIBILITY/STABILITY Distrust, Antagonism Reserved Credibility in 
the EU offering Stability 
of own Commitments, 
Readiness for ‘candid 
talk’
THE RULE OF LAW Ambiguity Ambiguity though 
‘institutionalized in the 
discourse’ 
3.4.3.Concluding Remark
This part of the study concludes the Chapter III aimed at the analysis of the 
impact of the EU discourse on the Russian behavior around the remarkable 
case of the conflict in Georgia. It indicates that the effect can be observed 
along two dimensions: securing the EU’s ‘principled’ positions in Georgia 
serving as an opening to the Caucasus, and turning the page in the EU-Russia 
relations to the level somewhat higher than ‘only business’ engaging into 
constructive dialogue where the words credibility and stability in the 
framework of peace and security emerge in the two discourses flagging the 
possibility of some sort of long-term approach to partnership. 
What the EU could push for, however, was limited by complex multilevel 
context of negotiations. Reserved rationality measured by bi-lateral 
relationships as well as commitments towards the EU defined the 
negotiations process. The dynamics also indicate evolving, self-reinforcing 
nature of the EU discourse that adds the new character to the broader 
context of its ‘actroness’. 
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Chapter VI
Taking the Analysis Further 
4.1. Introduction
The final chapter of the study serves the purpose of broadening the 
context of the analysis towards the EU FP ‘actorness’ based on the empirical 
observations of the EU and the Russian discourses. 
It will build on two working hypotheses: An actor with 27 faces, discussing 
reserved rationality and contextual limitations present in the EU discourse 
acute in the ‘angry voices’ section, and a characteristic recurrent in the EU 
appearance in Moscow – The importance of personality in the EU FP. Uniting 
constructivist and rational supranationalist theories used in process of the 
analysis, it will expand to the ‘reserved constructivist’ observations. 
This analysis is devoted to the second interrogative framework: What new 
can the dynamics of the EU discourse tell us about the EU as a foreign policy 
actor?
Whilst analyzing the EU future as a foreign policy actor it is necessary to 
marginalize the effect of the theories elaborated for a particular case
(Lakatos 1972). This is just a part of the complicated whole of the EU FP 
‘actorness’. Instead, the question is whether there is something conceptually 
new to the interaction between the EU and the Russian discourses. This essay 
maintains there is, at least to the extent of expanding existing knowledge on 
the basis of empirical findings.
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4.2. An actor with 27 faces: 
Context and Reserved Rationality in the EU FP 
Discourse
Particular hypothesis maintains that the EU FP constructive discourse 
both in terms of practical and ideational change particularly in conflict 
management will always depend on 1. Context, 2. The logic of reserved 
rationality of the member-states. These features are acutely present in 
particular case study, and may be extended to the broader notion of the EU 
‘actorness’. 
4.2.1. Possible Explanations
Several existing explanations may be outlined in relation to contextual 
nature of the EU and to the logic of the member-states behavior. 
4.2.1.1. Context
‘Contextuality’ is not new. Existing studies already discussed the EU as a 
negotiator determined by contextual mobility (cf. Elgström, Strömvik in 
Elgström, Jönsson 2005). They built on the critique of traditional view of the
EU institutional complexity with absence of clear leadership (Meunier 2000), 
the problems of coordination, synchronization and linkage (Foster 2000), 
immobility and rigidness both in bargaining and problem-solving 
negotiations (cf. Elgstrom, Strömvik in Elgström. Jönsson 2005). 
Those studies relate mainly to the EU negotiating capacities elsewhere – in 
aid and trade, or environment, for instance, where the EU is clearly one of the 
global leaders. Prior EU FP engagements particularly in conflict solving 
concerned the states to whom the EU was superior (cf. Strömvik 2005). 
This study sees the FP context as starting with external relationships 
existing between the member states and Russia – a remarkable partner on 
several accounts. 
The EU found itself in the situation of greater economic and political 
complexity that determined its discourse formation, which explains its 
limitations whereby the EU performed as a participant more than a power. 
Despite the fact that the EU discourse was status-quo oriented in terms of 
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preserving the virtue of international law and Georgian territorial integrity, 
thus expected to have been more conservative (Elgström, Strömvik in 
Elgström, Jönsson 2005), some other logic prevailed during the negotiations.
4.2.1.2. Conflict of Rationality
Various studies explain the EU negotiations behavior. For instance, the 
importance of coalitions according to policy interest or cultural affinity has 
been raised increasingly (Elgstrom et al., 2001).
The possibility of the larger members to dissent can be understood by 
inclination of the smaller members to mediate their interest according to the 
majority, especially so in the Council (Zimmer et. al. 2005).  This facilitates 
not only economic but also territorial, historic and cultural clashes (A. Smith
1991: 14). Hence the conflict arises when weighty rationalities are 
endangered or gain on others’ expense (Hix 1999: 73). In internal 
negotiations the EU is associated with the logic of the most conservative 
member, or the lowest common denominator (Elgström, Jönsson 2000).
Extending to the FP, if the logic is too conflicting as in case with Iraq, the 
negotiations would rather stumble than continue.
In particular case this sum was represented by the much displeased the 
UK-Poland-the Baltic coalition, which nevertheless did not affect the process. 
The character of negotiations is also known to be floating: from tough 
bargaining to problem-solving consensus normally prevailing in day-to-day 
negotiations and dependent on level of politization and type of policy 
(Elgström, Jönsson 2000). This relates to the heated debates about the 
reasons behind the member-states’ behavior unfolded between social 
constructivists and rationalists. Broadly, it is the rational logic of expected 
consequences, or “consequentialism” (Risse 2000) vs. social constructivist 
“logic of appropriateness” (March, Olsen 1998). While former focuses on the
narrow profit calculations failing to encompass the complexity of 
socialization processes in the EU discourse formation, the latter concentrates 
on utopian notions of good will, strong norms and the role of identities. 
Checkel provided a good middle-ground combining constructivist theory 
of social learning with rationalist instrumental and non-instrumental 
processes whereby domestic contexts delimit the role of persuasion and 
social learning facilitating compliance via “argumentative persuasion”
(Checkel 2001).
Rise approached constructivist conundrum by differentiating the 
processes of argumentation, deliberation, and persuasion based on 
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Habermas’s communicative action theory, as a distinct mode of social 
interaction contrasted to both strategic bargaining and the “rule-guided 
behavior”. He dived, however, too deep into notions of “truth seeking” on the 
way towards reasoned consensus (Risse 2000).
Pierson through more skeptic glasses of historical institutionalist path 
dependency introduced the logic of “increasing returns” penetrated by big or 
small or contingent events, all of which being “critical moments” in locating 
irreversibility of political development (Pierson 2000).
4.2.2. The Logic of Soft Rationality in Constructive EU FP 
Discourse 
Building on such analogies this study finds a correlation between 
constructivist logic of the EU as having impact on other actors emanating 
change for the EU FP ‘actorness’ with the logic of ‘softly’ calculated 
rationalities against each other and against the framework of the EU, as
derived from rational supranationalism. 
First, it is important to outline which empirical observations particular 
hypothesis builds upon.
4.2.2.1. How Was the EU Discourse Limited?
The EU stakes can be roughly summarized as follows: 1. economic and 
trade relations with the “emerging market right on our doorstep”
necessitating continuing growth and modernization of Russia, 2. security of 
energy supplies 3. the role in “effective international community” and “non-
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction” (Ferrero-Waldner 2008p).
Thus in reviewing its relations with Russia the EU found “no better way to 
pursue our own interests, and make our concerns listened to” by postponing 
new cooperation agreement, but not through other economic or diplomatic 
sanctions. 
The above can be explained by the EU being, after all, a supranational actor
uniting the 27 path-dependent bi-lateral relationships. For instance, Germany 
and France are known for their special ties with Russia. Germany imports 34 
percent of its oil and 36 percent of its natural gas (Telegraph 2008h). If 
economic relations functionally drew Germany, France and Italy with Russia,
the UK on the contrary has been 80 per cent self-sufficient and is pioneering 
the green agenda (Brown 2008d). Moreover, it is closely allied with the 
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American political stance. The Baltic States in their turn are known for 
political sensitivity against the Russian ‘regime’.
Apart from constant poling between the EU and Moscow of whose stakes 
in cooperation are higher, the logic of EU discourse followed a rule of 
measured rationality in the EU demands taking into account its partner-
negotiator. The EU was limited both by context and bi-lateral ties of its 
members.
4.2.2.2. The logic of Reserved Rationality in the EU ‘actorness’
The analysis indicated that the EU discourse had an impact on the Russian 
behavior engaging into constructive dialogue evoking the notions of 
credibility and stability in the framework of peace and security. 
What the EU could achieve and how, was limited by complex multi-level 
context of the member states’ reserved rationalities derived from the 
aforementioned factors. 
There is another important factor. The EU FP is closely related to 
constructing its international image (Elgström, Jönsson 2000). Should the 
leaders have destroyed their conceivable unity, the restoration of the EU 
image would have been very costly. Hence some states, as the UK in 
particular case, would probably chose to agree, if not act, beyond their 
national interests if the EU process is enacted and at stake.
For instance, whilst the ‘UK-camp’ limited itself with public accusations 
outside the EU negotiations, France and Germany were equally vocal with the 
UK and Poland, about strong condemnation of Russia’s geo-political, or 
territorial, divisions of Georgia clearly represented in Moscow on behalf of 
the EU. 
Additionally the EU capitalizes on driving forward its integration process 
via its discourse: “solidarity” “in the energy sphere is a principle laid down in 
the Lisbon Treaty”. “The events in Georgia dramatically underline the 
necessity of the Lisbon Treaty” (Pöttering 2008i).
In this sense the EU FP is not merely a practice; it is a constellation of 
various practices dependent on multi-layered interdependencies existing in 
IR.
So, what is reserved rationality (see box 1)? It is the rationality of the 
members states carefully measured against the framework of other EU 
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members, with the common denominator usually being the state(s) with 
higher stakes. Simultaneously it is measured through the framework of the 
EU: when cooperation is enacted even the influential actors would choose to 
agree, if not act, against own national interests. All of that derives from 
complicated contextual factors such as bi-lateral historic ties of the EU 
members. 
This reserved rationality is borrowed from rational supranationalist 
theory that maintains that the EU institutional practices can be limiting or 
encouraging depending on the context and path-dependency. By analogy to 
Pierson’s increasing return, the point of departure for this measured 
rationality probably rests in the members(s) with the highest stakes in 
negotiations, e.g. energy relations. The EU does not exist in a vacuum and 
cannot claim to redefine exogenous contexts of its members, especially when 
the stakes are high, which may define its FP, particularly in security as one of 
the most complicated policy spheres. 
This logic differentiates between the discussion of the social processes 
(appropriate behavior) and the level of political discourses where neither the 
powers nor the possibilities are equal or constant. 
It can not be explained by strictly rational outcomes or consequentiality. 
Even if the balance of interest is not perfect, cooperation continues because 
the members chose to measure their rationalities also against the framework 
of the EU. 
This formula maintains that the EU will serve to change other actors via 
discursive practices to the extent its own context sees it viable. It is a 
possibility in terms of the capacity to balance the EU interests and conduct a 
dialogue within tense political environment. It is a constraint because this 
reflexivity may tend to erase the borders of how much compromise the EU 
can make. 
The above may be subsumed by the following statement by Solana (Solana 
2008k):
The point is not that we have abolished national interests in the European 
Union. Rather, the point is that we agree that the best way to safeguard these 
interests is by working together. Moreover, working together helps to create 
and identify common European interests. So, it is a two-way street. This is a 
fundamental truth, which bears repeating.
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4.3. The Importance of Personality in EU FP4
I would like to pay tribute to President Sarkozy whose strong reaction and 
leadership have shown what the EU can do when it is united in determination 
and in action. The extraordinary European Council on 1 September sent a 
strong and clear message and we can already see the results. Not everything 
has been done but a very important part of what has to be done has been 
agreed and done.
Javier Solana
During a press conference in Moscow 
Sarkozy noted to Medvedev: “as you see, I 
did not listen to those who said I should 
not come here. By the way, I would like to 
say, it seems hard to solve crises without 
talking to each other”. To which 
Medvedev responded: “Nikolas, you 
made a right decision to come. I told you 
on the phone yesterday that only the one 
who takes an active stand reaches 
success” (own translation in Medvedev 
2008c).
Going back to prior argument that the two leaders in France and in 
Moscow may have been a perfect match – both being ‘sober’ politicians with a 
set of appropriate personal qualities – it is possible to speculate on what the 
outcome could have been 
if, say, PM Gordon Brown 
headed the EU diplomatic 
discourse. 
Perhaps, the EU-Russian 
relationship would have 
not reached a ‘crossroads’ 
but an effective deadlock 
counterproductive both for 
the EU and for Russia. Plus, 
the Russian troops may have remained in Georgia. Finally, the situation may 
                                                          
4 Pictures adopted from russia.foreignpolicyblogs.com and www.daylife.com
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have caused much greater tension on the international arena, between Russia 
and the US for instance. After all, the EU discourse managed to complete its 
‘historical mission’ originated in the EPC framework elaborated against the 
Cold-War tensions in Europe (K. Smith 2003). 
Sarkozy remarkably represented the European Union Council Presidency, 
which together with the Council of ministers itself is the central mechanism 
in the II Pillar, or CFSP, decision-making (Elgström, Strömvik in Elgström, 
Jönsson 2005). The EU Presidency has already been discussed with utmost
attention (Elgstrom et. al. 2001, Tallberg 2004). Just as the Council of 
ministers itself is considered to be intergovernmental activism, the 
Presidency ahead of it is an inherently biased enterprise. It is represented by 
a national leader factually putting one state in front of the EU, thus, it can 
either encourage the ‘visions of the future’ suppressing the national interests, 
or, indeed, exploit its opportunity to pursue with those interests on the EU 
arena (the possibility for which was discussed in the above sections). It can 
shape the agenda of the negotiation process by pooling, structuring or 
excluding the issues; moreover, it possesses the informational and structural 
resources to resolve incompatibilities of national interests on the EU level 
(Tallberg in Elgstrom et. al 2003, Tallberg 2004). 
In particular case the importance of leadership and representation in the 
EU negotiation process is constant, perhaps reifying all of those findings. 
During the EU discourse formation, the Presidency solved at least two grand 
problems: time-efficiency, and process efficiency - resolved negotiation 
complexity of the EU by holding a strong grasp of the process.  Notably, on 
both levels: determining the path of external negotiations process, and 
internal discourse formation. It contributed to effectuating practical and 
ideational change via measured diplomatic approach.
It is not only the role of 
Presidency per se, but the role of 
the French President Sarkozy. 
Whether it is the ‘French’ or 
‘Sarkozy’ that is the key word here 
is debatable. Probably, it is a 
mixture of both. France is a 
powerful country, and may be 
assumed to have played on its 
weight and political ties of France and Russia which Sarkozy personally 
decided to sustain. 
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For the EU ‘actorness’ it is important because it impersonates the 27 
leaders, each with own diplomatic qualities and personal attributions, which
makes the EU FP process (un)predictable. It defines how the leader pushes 
out the national or the EU agenda and the EU ability to find the tactical 
coincidence with other discourses. 
At the same time one successful personality is a quality test for the EU. 
Sarkozy pursued with remarkable Presidency and emerged as an agent for 
peace. He also proved unusual leadership skills persuading some states to 
agree against their preferences, and sitting at the table with Russia. However, 
while massaging his own, he must have bruised some other egos, which may 
echo in future EU FP endeavors. 
This is the final for this study, and probably the most charismatic point for 
the EU’s foreign policy future.
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Chapter V
Conclusions
This study analyzed the discursive capacity of the European Union as a 
supranational foreign policy actor in changing the Russian behavior as a 
result of interaction between the two discourses around the conflict over the 
Georgian breakaway territories of South Ossetia and Abkhazia framed by the 
‘Sarkozy - Medvedev Agreement’. 
It also extended the framework to the broader context of the EU as a 
foreign policy actor. 
It asked two major questions: ‘What was the impact of the EU discourse on 
the Russian behavior?’ and ‘What new can the dynamics of the EU discourse 
tell us about the EU as a foreign policy actor’?
The conclusions that can be made on the basis of the empirical analysis
were that participation in the fate of Georgia was, indeed, very opportunistic 
for the EU FP. Of course, the extent to which the EU could affect the Russian 
behavior was limited. Also, the point was probably not to make Russia act, 
feel or think like the EU but to act in a conceivable peaceful manner. 
The dynamic process of the EU and the Russian discourses demonstrated
several new variables. The EU made a successful step to sharing competencies 
in the Caucasus firstly, by finding a tactical coincidence with Russia through 
excellent diplomatic undermine, and secondly, by evoking long-awaited 
rhetoric in the Russian discourse of measured credibility, stable 
commitments and readiness for future cooperation based on, if not full 
agreement, than strategic openness, beneficial for the future of the EU. 
The thing that differentiates the EU from ‘superpowers’ is that it does not 
mind other actors to gain from the process – that makes it a true carrier at 
least of the value of inclusiveness in the international system, or true multi-
polarity.
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There is a limit to what the EU can do, of course. In trying to pursue with 
successful negotiations the EU will always be dependent on the reserved 
rationalities of 27 (or more) members. They will lift the priorities according 
to domestic interest on the case-to-case basis. However, united with a 
common framework they will also measure it against other members 
probably accounting for the member with the highest stake, and the EU itself 
sustaining its image. 
Thus the EU can be credited with supranational commitment – its 
members have an ability to agree, if not act, against own national interests. 
This is a very empowering feature. The EU FP, however, is a complicated 
multilayered system of various practices that are reflexive to context and 
constantly evolving.
Finally, the EU bears, indeed, the 27 faces – personalities of its leaders
each with own charisma and habits. They should, however, be able to 
promote the international identity of the EU that may sometimes force to 
step over own interests, hopefully without personal resentment.
As to the EU and Russia, they have probably a future of some pan-
European policy ahead. As Solana put it in the interview to Interfax in 
February 2009 (Solana 2009):
Building trust takes time, but we have learnt from our own experience in 
the EU, that it can be done through a combination of common interests, 
values, rules, and institutions. This has allowed us to remove dividing 
lines between us in an unprecedented way.
The journey of prospective conclusions…
Abandoning this research, suffice it to say the world today is an 
analytically exciting place. Changed irrevocably by economic and financial 
crises, environmental and humanitarian challenges international politics also 
audits the policy accounts of its influential actors.
The US is losing its global monopoly (e.g. Keohane, Nye 2000). Russia is 
increasing its long-lost might and goes to a direction a bulk of observers, 
probably including Russia, are curious about (e.g. Krastev 2008). Perhaps, it 
is a journey more than a destination. Yet when it comes the ‘Minesweeper’ -
USA vs. Russia – the attempts to ‘reset’ relationships feel much like porcelain, 
take negotiations between Presidents Medvedev and Obama on NATO, and
their ’easy-going but serious’ agreement to disagree only on Georgia in G20.5
                                                          
5 http://www.neurope.eu/articles/93911.php, Interview with: Konstantin Kosachev, Duma 
International Affairs Committee Chairman, 4 April 2009 - Issue : 828
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The EU on the other hand, is marching steadily into the future with its 
‘soft’ power, as the study sustains. Even though most of the EU members are 
also the members of NATO, and thus have a potential, if not a tendency, to act 
militaristically, it may be assumed that the EU framework itself is 
constraining to the exercise of diplomacy. It is not necessarily because of the 
“capabilities – expectations gap” (Hill 1993), neither it is only the normative 
constraints of the testaments at the heart of the EU integration process. It has 
a generic predisposition to civil/diplomatic leadership. It does possess the 
power to influence other actors’ behavior through its diplomatic discourse, 
which is also evolving and self-reinforcing as seen from the perspective of the 
study.
The relationship with Russia is crucially important. The EU is being 
increasingly remembered by the states to the East of its borders. All of them 
are in one way or another related to Russia, which is simultaneously the 
biggest EU energy partner. The Iron Curtain has long been gone for good, and 
the two are close in many respects. 
The EU brokering deal may be an exciting opening for its future. Recent 
elections crisis in Chisinau, Moldova, for example, already evoked the EU to 
participate.6 The on-going Ukraine discourse is moving closer and closer to 
supporting the Union rhetoric and the EU, against all odds, seems to drive 
closer to Ukraine. Even Georgia may be interpreted as moving closer to the 
EU. What could be the EU future in the region, and in global politics? How will 
the EU establish itself as a buffer between NATO and other international 
actors? 
                                                          
6 http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/moscow-warns-eu-over-moldova-
1666848.html
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Executive Summary
This study is about the European Union and its discursive capacity as a 
supranational foreign policy actor. It drives on the discourse analysis of 
impact of the EU on the Russian behavior as a result of negotiations around 
the conflict over the Georgian breakaway territories of South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia framed by the ‘Sarkozy - Medvedev Agreement’ during the period of 
August 18 2008 – October 21 2008. 
The interest rests also in the broader context of the EU as a foreign policy 
actor. Hence, specific case-study will help generate several hypotheses about 
the factors that may have influenced the negotiation process and that can be 
extended to the EU foreign policy ‘actorness’ in general, such as reserved 
rationality in the EU logic and the importance of personality in the EU FP.
The study maintains the following analytical framework: the EU is a 
supranational foreign policy actor that exists in a complex international 
environment. Whilst pursuing with its foreign policy its unique nature, that 
after all encapsulates 27 ‘normal’ states, challenges to overcome contextual 
pressures as well as historical bi-lateral ties of its members. Constructive 
capacity to change other actors’ behavior here finds its limits (at least before 
circumstances change), which could be understood as reserved constructivist 
change.
This does not mean that these challenges render the EU as a foreign policy 
actor impossible. Although opinions in process of the EU discourse formation 
can sometimes differ, the member-states instead of stumbling into the 
process chose to follow the logic of soft rationality – measured both in 
relation to each other and to the framework of the EU. The EU discourse 
evolves with every step; its successful ventures such as negotiations with 
Russia over Georgia may help understand the new dimensions to the EU as a 
foreign policy actor.
The Russian case is fresh and remarkable in various respects. First, Russia 
is not just a random actor. It entails the legacy of complicated socio-political 
interdependencies with the Union member-states. Moreover, it tends to view 
the EU in close relation to NATO – which can be interpreted as essentially 
skeptic. Finally, Russia is the main strategic partner in energy and trade, 
therefore the Union cannot be viewed as a superior power.  This context 
creates certain ‘quality check’ for the EU.
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Theoretically and methodologically, the entire analysis adopts 
constructivist logic combined with rational supranationalism - emphasizing 
‘soft’ rationalist (as opposed to fixed preferences of the member-states) 
reservations in the discourse formation. Thus the discourse is not only an 
illustration of interaction but also of a series of steps pursued by the both 
sides. Discourse analysis, which is the method chosen for the study,  follows
the logic of dynamics of the negotiation process, thus major analytical 
emphasis would be on the interaction between the EU and Russia – e.g. how 
the Russian discourse changed in accordance with the EU measures and
rhetoric. Simultaneously, it captures broader context of the EU ‘actorness’. 
The study asks two major questions, which serve as interrogative 
frameworks: ‘What was the impact of the EU discourse on the Russian 
behavior?’ and ‘What new can the dynamics of the EU discourse tell us about 
the EU as a foreign policy actor’?
The aim of the first interrogative framework is in-depth assessment of the 
EU and the Russian discourses and their interaction. Firstly, the analysis 
observes two discourses in parallel comparing perceptions of the conflict. 
This is done with the purpose to highlight strategic contrast and correlation, 
which will help to elucidate the two narratives surrounding the conflict to 
subsequently test for change:  ‘Sharing Competencies in the Caucasus’ and ‘The 
New Security Architecture?’.
Secondly, the impact of the EU discourse on the Russian behavior is 
analyzed in interaction between the two discourses. Taking into account the 
specifics of the case, it is possible to observe discursive change both in 
relation to practical EU measures, and simultaneous penetration of its 
principles. Hence the second step is to assess the impact of the EU civil and 
diplomatic measures, finally, the impact around the narratives elaborated 
previously. 
The analysis concludes that the effect can be observed along two 
dimensions: securing the EU’s ‘principled’ positions in Georgia serving as an 
opening to the Caucasus, and turning the page in the EU-Russia relations to 
the level somewhat higher than ‘only business’ engaging into constructive 
dialogue where the words credibility and stability in the framework of peace 
and security emerge in the Russian discourse flagging the possibility of some 
sort of long-term approach to partnership. 
What the EU could push for, however, was limited by complex multilevel 
context of negotiations. Reserved rationality measured by bi-lateral 
relationships as well as commitments towards the EU defined the 
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negotiations process. The dynamics also indicate evolving, self-reinforcing 
nature of the EU discourse that adds the new character to the broader 
context of its ‘actroness’. 
This bears ground to assess the second interrogative framework: What 
new can the dynamics of the EU discourse tell us about the EU as a foreign 
policy actor?
Herein, the analysis seeks to explain the EU ‘actorness’ in a broader 
context. It elaborates two working hypotheses: An actor with 27 faces: 
Context and Reserved Rationality in the EU FP Discourse, discussing reserved 
rationality and contextual limitations present in the EU discourse during 
negotiations; and another characteristic recurrent in the EU appearance in 
Moscow – The importance of personality in EU FP.
It concludes that while pursuing with its foreign policy, the EU will always 
be characterized by contextual dependence resulting from reserved 
rationality of it members. It is carefully measured against the framework of 
other EU members, with the common denominator usually being the state(s) 
with higher stakes. Simultaneously it is measured through the framework of 
the EU: when cooperation is enacted even the influential actors would choose 
to agree, if not act, against own national interests. All of that derives from 
complicated nature of the EU foreign policy.
Also the EU foreign policy will always be dependent on personal 
representation of the EU. For the EU ‘actorness’ it is important because it 
impersonates the 27 leaders, each with own diplomatic qualities and 
personal attributions, which makes the EU FP process (un)predictable. It 
defines how the leader pushes out the national, or the EU agenda and the EU 
ability to find the tactical coincidence with other discourses. 
At the same time one successful personality is a quality test for the EU. 
Sarkozy pursued with remarkable Presidency and emerged as an agent for 
peace. He also proved unusual leadership skills persuading some states to 
agree against their preferences, and sitting at the table with Russia. However, 
while massaging his own, he must have bruised some other egos, which may 
echo in future EU FP endeavors. 
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